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Abstract
This thesis is divided into two parts. In the first of these 
we consider Ackermann-type set theories and many of our results 
concern natural models.
We prove a number of results about the existence of natural 
models of Ackermann's set theory, A, and applications of this work 
are shovm to answer several questions raised by Reinhardt in [56]. 
A"^  ( introduced in [56] ) is another Ackermann-type set theory
and we show that its set theoretic part is precisely ZF, Then we 
introduce the notion of natural models of A"*" and show how our 
results on natural models of A extend to these models. There are 
a number of results about other Ackermann-type set theories and 
some of the work which was already known for ZP is extended to A, 
This includes permutation models, which are shown to answer 
another of Reinhardt's questions.
In the second part we consider the different approaches to 
set theory; dealing mainly with the more philosophical aspects.
We reconsider Cantor's work, suggest that it has frequently been 
misunderstood and indicate how quasi-construetive set theories 
seem to use a definite part of Cantor's earlier ideas. Other 
approaches to set theory are also considered and criticised. The 
section on NP includes some more technical observations on ordered 
pairs.
There is also an appendix, in which we outline some results 
on extended ordinal arithmetic.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
1.1 Outline
Part 1 of this thesis concerns Ackermann-type set theories.
In chapter 2 we introduce Ackermann's set theory, discuss its 
motivation, and show how it is related to other set theories.
Then, in chapter 3, we prove some results about the existence 
of natural models of Ackermann's set theory. A, and applications 
of this work are shown to answer several questions raised by 
Reinhardt in [56]. The subject of chapter 4 is A* , an Ackermann- 
type set theory which was introduced in [56] • We show that its 
set theoretic part is precisely ZF, answering another question of 
Reinhardt's, Then we give several alternative axiomatisations of 
, introduce the notion of its natural models and extend the 
results of chapter 3 to these models.
The first part of chapter 5 introduces two new Ackermann-type 
set theories and we investigate some of their properties. Some 
other Ackermann-type set theories are also discussed in that chapter. 
Chapter 6 contains several isolated results, including proofs that 
an Ackermann-type theory suggested by Wang is inconsistent and that 
extending permutation models to A enables us to answer another 
question of Reinhardt's,
In chapter 7 we consider some problems concerning natural 
models of ZF. One of them arises as a generalisation of the 
natural models of A and A"*" . The others concern the structure of 
natural models under the relation of elementary extension: they
were motivated by some of the results in chapter 3»
In part 2 of this thesis we consider and criticise the 
different approaches to set theory which have been made. This 
part mostly concerns the philosophical aspects and we often seem
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to disagree with the accepted views.
We describe Cantor's work in chapter 8, Then we emphasise 
its second order nature, indicate how it seems to have been 
misunderstood and suggest that a lot of later work was motivated 
by such misunderstandings. Part of chapter 9 gives a justification 
of ZP in Cantorian terms and in the remainder of that chapter we 
consider related problems and quasi-constractive approaches.
Most of chapter 10 concerns the theory KP, One section shows 
that it is very important to note which definition of ordered pair 
is used in this theory. In the remainder of chapter 10 we consider 
approaches to set theories with a universal set via theories of 
properties.
The appendix contains some results on extended ordinal 
arithmetic and a result on the number of ordinals obtained by 
permuting a given sequence of ordinals and taking their sums.
The main topics which we have considered are rather disconn­
ected, but we hope that they do not form a discordant mixture.
Also, it seems a shame that this thesis has to be linearly ordered 
as several of the topics intertwine. We apologise for the number 
of cross references,
1.2 Notation
Most of our notation is that which is becoming standard in 
set theory ( for instance, are variables
which range over ordinals ) and, in general, we follow the 
notation of [56] , However, we wish to emphasise the following 
abbreviations which are not completely standard.
is the power set operation, * U (  f (R^ )) and the
natural models of ZP are those of the form ( R \  , 6 ^  R%^ .
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We write R#t 1 for R(oC t ) and we often drop the T RX , or even 
all mention of € , from our natural model notation. Thus, for 
example, R'X: X R ^ means that (Ro: , g h Roc) is a proper 
elementary_substructure of (R^ , e R^|g,y # When R«. *<^R^
stands for R°c <R^4-x ,
If a and b are sets with a ib, then Df(a,b) is the set of those 
elements of a which are definable in ^a,e  ^a) using a first order 
C  -formula and parameters from b. The letters X  are always
assumed to stand for £ -formulae and ^ , t are allowed to be any 
formulae.
We write x for the cardinality of x and x for the order type
of X, where the ordering is assumed to be 6 Tx if no other
ordering is mentioned. For convenience we always suppose that if 
4C is an inaccessible cardinal ( written Inao( ^  ) ) then &: .
Our notation for Ackermann-type set theories is explained in 
chapter 2 and the following abbreviations are used for other set 
theories,
ZP - Zermelo-Praenkel set theory with the axiom of
foundation, see [l6] ,
Z - ZP without the axiom of replacement.
ZF® - ZP without the axiom of foundation,
ZM - ZP together with an axiom schema stating that every
normal function has an inaccessible fixed point, see [593 
NBG - von Neumann-Bemays-Godel set theory, see [433 *
For convenience we assume that NBG is axiomatised with 
an axiom of foundation for sets only: this is clearly
equivalent to the formulation of [43] «
MK - Morse-Kelly set theory, see [45] . This theory is
NBG modified by allowing class quantifiers to appear in
the class existence axiom and it is sometimes called
impredicative NBG,
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NP - Quine's system in [53] * which is now called New 
Foundations,
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Chapter 2 
Review of Ackermami's set theory
2.1 Ackermann's paper
Ackermann's set theory was introduced in [l'] , In section 
one of that paper Ackermann describes his fundamental ideas in a 
heuristic form, and he starts from Cantor's 1895 definition of a 
set which says
" A set is any collection into a v/hole of definite, distinct 
objects of our perception or our thought. These objects are called 
the elements of the set, "
Whether or not Cantor intended this to be a definition is a 
problem which we shall consider later. Before describing Ackermann's 
ideas we note that many of his remarks seem more in keeping with 
Cantor's 1882 paper, rather than the later one. In the 1882 paper 
sets were thought of as " well defined " collections and Cantor 
says that
" A collection of elements belonging to any sphere of thought 
is said to be well defined when, in consequence of its definition 
and the logical principle of the excluded middle, it must be 
considered as intrinsically determined whether any object belonging 
to this sphere belongs to the collection or not and, secondly, 
whether two objects belonging to the collection are equal, or not, 
in spite of formal differences in the manner in which they are 
given. "
As is usual Ackermann disregards objects of our perception 
and he considers a general way of formalising Cantor's definition.
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Although it is not made explicit in [l] , Ackermann seems to be 
imagining a universe in which there are many objects which are not 
sets and, in general, these objects are called classes. Firstly 
he argues for the axioms
1. All classes are extensional,
2, For every property P(x), there is a class whose members 
are those sets which satisfy P(x),
and then he turns to his main axiom, and says
" The distinction between classes and sets can only be a 
matter of a satisfactorily fine definition of v/hat belongs to the 
class and what does not. But the concept of set is completely 
open, "
Consequently, he argues, one will not be able to think of a 
class as sufficiently precisely distinguished if it can only be 
defined with reference to the concept of a set. Thus he is led to 
suppose that if the property P(x) ( of a class which, it seems, is 
assumed to consist entirely of sets ) is such that its definition 
does not refer to the property of being a set then the extension 
of this property will be a set. Other sets are allowed as parameters.
The fourth axiom which is justified states that all members 
and subclasses of sets are also sets: the argument for the latter
is that such a class can be defined without reference to the general 
set concept, Ackermann then explains that the basic concepts of 
such a theory are identity, membership and sethood, and he indicates 
v/hy such a system is not immediately inconsistent. He also suggests 
that choice is a logical axiom, but it can be added in the usual 
way if so desired.
In section two of [l] a formal system for Ackermann’s set 
theory is set up and we explain the current formulation, which is
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easily seen to be equivalent to the original one. The system is 
set up in the first order predicate calculus with identity. € is 
used for membership and a constant, V, is included for the class 
of all sets. Remembering our convention that small Greek letters 
stand for (€. , := )-formulae and large Greek letters for any formulae, 
the counterparts of 1, 2 and 4 are
A1 V t  (tex<-^t€y)^ X = y,
A2 3zV t  (tez<-tt<fV^$ ), where Î does not involve z,
A3 x€ V ^ ( y £ x  vy^x) ye V,
To formalise the main axiom we then take the following schema
A4 If has exactly three free variables, then 
x,y6 V ^ Vt ( ^  (x,y,t) -> te V)
3 z e . v V t  (tf: z W  ^'(x,y,t)).
Ackermann did not include an axiom of foundation in his theory 
but it is convenient to introduce one here,
A3 x C V  ^ j u u e x  -^3u$x Vte X t&u.
Next we give some abbreviations which we shall use throughout 
this work, WB(x ) is intended to be read " X is well behaved ”, 
and WB(y ) is often the basis of a theory which generalises 
Ackermann’s set theory ( A ),
Definition 2.1 A is the theory with axioms Al, A2, A3 and A4,
A* is A augmented by A5, WB(X) [  WB* (X) j  is the collection of 
axioms Al, A2, A3 and A3] in which V has been replaced by X,
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Aokermann showed that the relativisations to V of all the 
axioms of Z, except foundation, are provable in A. These proofs 
are particularly elegant. For instance, to prove the power set 
axiom let 0  be t Sx so that A3 gives t€ V when xS V. Then the 
power set of x is in V by A4, He also claimed to prove that this 
was true for replacement but, as Levy pointed out in [38], there 
is a mistake in his proof.
The only other notion from [l] which we shall refer to is 
a theory mentioned in the last psirt of that paper. This incorporates 
different orders of sets and, in an equivalent formulation, it has 
a constant and infinitely many constants for n6(p,
Ackermann did not feel that this theory was particularly important 
as he said
” Such a theory is of no great interest as all important 
sets are already contained in sets of the first order. ”
Definition 2,2 aJ, is a theory with 6 as a predicate and constants 
and Vp for ne to . Its axioms are all sentences of the form 
(V.jo ) and ), where ^(V) is an axiom of A’^ together with
\  ^ for n a w .
2,2 The development of A
A, and related systems, have been studied in [38] , [40] ,
[ 22] and [58] and rather than attribute all results individually 
we shall just give the main kno\m results for A, Further details 
are contained in [ 36] and we refer the reader to that work for 
our omissions.
It is possible to develop a theory of ordinals in A which is 
similar to that of ZF and in A^ it can be shown that .
From this and A4 the following reflection principles can be
~ 12 -
obtained# These are extremely useful for proving results in A* #
Theorem 2,3 (i) Dovmward reflection principle for V ( DR ),
If <j> has exactly three free variables, then 
A^ hx,y<S V ^  ^ (x,y,V) V ^ (x,y,z),
(ii) Up\7ard reflection principle for V ( UR ),
If ^ has exactly three free variables, then 
A*" hx,y eV  ^^ (x,y,V) -4 (V€z ^^(x,y,z)).
From UR we can see that in A^ , unlilce NBG, there are proper 
classes ( i,e, classes which are not sets ) which have proper classes 
as members, and that constructions of such classes can be continued 
for a long way.
In [38] Levy proved the next theorem and this shows that 
A^ is not stronger than ZP,
Theorem 2,4 If ^ is a sentence and h ^  or A^ V" , then ZF  \r é  .
After the discovery of the mistake in Ackermann’s proof of 
replacement relativised to V, the main open question for A"*" ( and
A, T/here it is still open ) v/as whether or not it is provable.
This has been answered affirmatively by Reinhardt in [56] and, 
consequently, the following result is now known.
Theorem 2.5 If ^ is a sentence, then A’*‘ \r iff ZF V" ^ ,
It might be argued that on the basis of this theorem there 
is little point in continuing the study of A'^  , but we have several 
arguments against this. Firstly, there is the fact that the 
reflection principles cannot be expressed in ZF, They are particu­
larly interesting as in [40J it is shov/n that A^ can be
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axiomatised using WB* (v) and DR, The second argument is more 
important and it is that there are many natural generalisations 
of Ackermann’s approach to set theory while this is not the case 
for ZP, In the motivation for A4 it was said that if a property 
can he used to form a set then this property must not depend on 
the set concept. Then, to insist that the set concept does not 
appear in the definition of the property is the crudest way of 
satisfying this condition. Consequently, further refinement of 
these ideas seems quite likely to give theories which are stronger 
than ZP, Such theories are called Ackermann-type set theories. 
Other reasons why we think that such theories are important are 
that the use of more basic notions might make proofs clearer and 
that their natural models often turn out to be of independent 
interest.
In [58] Levy also considered adding a strong replacement 
axiom ( i.e. the replacement axiom of NBG ) to A* , and combining 
one of his results with one from [56] gives theorem 2,7,
Definition 2.6 A* is the theory augmented by the axiom 
x€ V A V u 6  x 3 v e V  (u,v) e r 3 y 6  v V u g x  3ve y (u,v) 6  r.
Theorem 2.7 If ^  is a sentence, then a J iff Zlvlf* ^  ,
Theorem 2.8 is proved in [56] using a straightforward, proof- 
theoretic argument and UR, It shows that A ^  gives no new 
information about ,
Theorem 2.8 If (j} has exactly one free variable,then 
A», (- ) iff A* t- ^é(V).
We shall refer to other work which has been done on Ackermann-
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type set theories as we require it,
2,3 Comparison with other set theories
We shall summarise the main relationships between ,
ZF, NBG and MIC, and, for this section, we assume that all of these 
theories are consistent. For convenience, we use V for both the 
constant of and the defined constant of NBG.
Definition 2.9 is the formula p with all its quantifiers
relativised to ' € V  and is the formula Î with all its
quantifiers relativised to If T is an appropriate set
theory, then we put
T I V = Y I is a sentence and T j- 
T | @ ) - { t | p i s a  sentence and T V- î ^ ’} ,
and are the natural ways of interpreting formulae of
ZP and NBG, respectively, in A* . The following results follow 
from theorems which we quoted in the last section, well known 
results or easy checks,
A^ I V = ZP * NBGIV C  m i V  C  A* I V,
1ŒG C  MK C  i (? ) r> A»' I ®  .
Now the only questions about such inclusions which are not 
answered are those concerning A"* \ and NBG or MK, Theorem 
2,10 shows that there are no further strict inclusions here, so that 
although A* I V = ZP, the situation changes completely when we 
consider A** I ®  ,
Theorem 2.10 (i) NBG ^  A* * ®  ,
(ii) A* I @  ^  m .
Proof (i) Suppose that NBG S  A*** | ®  . Then strong replacement
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would be provable in so that A^ - A* . This is false.
(ii) Suppose that A* I ® C M K ,  Then as 
MK V 3«c(Y s. ^ Inac(cc)) ( see [45] » for instance ) and 
downT/ard reflection holds in A* we would have MK \r 3 «c g V Inac('au 
This is a contradiction as the consistency of MK can be proved 
in ZP f 3 oc Inac(«c ), □
Next, \/e shall indicate how A^ is very useful for accomodat­
ing category theory. In [42] , MacLane said that NBG is sufficient 
to describe all of present day category theory with the exception 
that it cannot accomodate categories above large categories. Large 
categories are proper classes in the sense of NBG, superlarge 
categories contain functions which are themselves proper classes etc, 
NBG has only finitely many axioms and let ^ be their conjunction.
If V = Roc then, from above, we know that holds in A^ *
Hence we can derive in A^ , using the upward reflection principle,
the existence of a least ^ for which 7 6 R^ and holds.
Now this R^ i has the very pleasant attribute that if any £  -property
can be proved to hold for all members of 7 ( which corresponds to
all small categories ) then all members of R ( which corresponds 
to all small, large, superlarge etc. categories ) also have this 
property. To see this one need only take the conjunction of the 
property and and use the upward reflection scheme. Thus R^
is a suitable universe for category theorists as they need only 
worry about small categories.
In actual practice only finitely many axioms of ZP, rather 
than all of NBG, would be required for proofs ( say, those axioms 
with less than 10*^ symbols ) so that the above procedure could be 
carried out with A* in place of A^ . Thus we suggest that until 
a consistent axiomatisation of a ( the? ) category of all categories 
is given, category theory can be neatly handled in A^ without any
- l6 -
artificialities having to be introduced,
2.4 Some reconsiderations
We do not find Ackermann's heuristic description of his theory 
in [l];or the arguments by which he obtains A from the basic idea, 
totally convincing. Hovæver this might, in some sense, be 
inevitable. Further, the ideas which led to A are not necessarily 
those which Ackermann published, and this suggestion is supported 
by the fact that A has been rediscovered by at least two other 
people who were not working from Cantor's definition.
In section one of £l ] the fundamental point at which 
Ackermann diverges from Cantor is when he allows proper classes 
in his domain of individuals. It is clear that he thought of them 
as well defined entities. Of course this is alien to Cantor's work 
and even Ackermann insists that the set concept is throughly open 
despite the fact that his theory proves the existence of a unique 
class which is the class of all sets. The ability to prove this
comes from A2 and in chapter 5 we show that the strength of
Ackermann-type systems strongly depends upon this axiom. Now, 
although A cannot be viewed as an axiomatisation of Cantor's work, 
there are many other systems which ass^ume the existence of a class 
of all sets, A is such a theory in which it is suggested that 
collections of sets which can only be defined by reference to V 
are of a different order of existence to those which can be defined 
without such reference. There are still problems about sets which 
are not definable and we consider some of these in chapter 8,
When Ackermann argues from his heuristic description to A he 
seems to ignore his earlier idea that the only difference between 
a set and a proper class is " a matter of a satisfactorily fine
definition of what belongs to a class and what does not ", Such a
statement surely leads us to question the use of the excluded
- 17 -
middle for formulae which involve Y, An intuitionistic version 
of A has been worked out in [51] » hut the motivation for this 
was completely different.
Despite these criticisms of the presentation of A, it can he 
viewed as just being based on the dovmward reflection principle for 
V so that it is not necessary to consider the original ideas behind 
it at all.
It is very interesting to consider other ways of formalising 
Ackermann’s notion of the class of all sets not being sharply 
delimited, Reinhardt suggested ( in [56] ) that one way of doing 
this would be to suppose that there are alternative candidates 
for such a class: this idea is considered further in chapters 4
and 5.
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Chapter 3 
Natural models of A
3*1 Existence of natural models
Natural models of A are models of this theory which take the 
form ^ Roc , R^ » , ^ ^ R^ , where Roc is the domain of the model
and Rp is the class of all sets in the model, ¥e shall usually
drop the suffix from £ and from now on we adopt the convention
that (R. is (^ Roc, R p , where tc. >
The natural models of A were first studied in [22] and the 
main results which Crewe gives in that paper are the next three 
theorems.
Theorem 3.1 If (B, U, S') A then U is not definable in ^B, Ü, E^ 
using an £ -formula and parameters from U,
Theorem 3.2 If' cc > P and Rj? f  Df(Roc ,Rf ), then  ^A.
Theorem 3,3 If R  ^ A then either R ^  <R«< or if % is the least 
ordinal such that ^ and Rj € Df(R*c,R^ ), then R^-^R^ ,
Actually Crewe only proves theorem 3.2 for the case when oc 
is a limit ordinal, but it is straightforward to extend this proof 
to the case v/hen oc -bn ( where n 6 to) by relativising
appropriate definitions to R(*>b .
Some further results on natural models of A are included in 
[ 56] and the main one of these is
Theorem 3,4 If ^  ^ and R^ ^  y Roc then (R oc b ^  , R ^  A,
The above theorems provide some knowledge about the structure
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of natural models of A, but only theorem 3»4 gives us examples of 
their existence. Our first main result, theorem 3*8, shows that 
assuming the existence of . inaccessible cardinals there are a 
large number of natural models of A, 7fe give some applications 
of this in the remainder of this chapter. Theorem 3*7 is a more 
general result which we shall use later, and theorem 3.6 is a 
straightforward modification of the main result of £47] : we
include a proof for completeness.
Throughout this chapter we always assume that there are 
arbitarily large inaccessible cardinals, although the existence 
of one or two inaccessible cardinals suffices for most of our 
results. Theorem 3*9, however, seems to require a stronger 
hypothesis.
Definition 3,3 A function f;oc is said to be regressive if
f(0) = 0 and for 0<^<oc f(^ )< ^.
Theorem 3.6 If jX is a regular cardinal greater than cP and f is 
a regressive function on S< , then there exists an < % such that 
for ic many ^ C ^ , f ( p )  ^ ^  •
Proof Suppose that the hypothesis of the theorem holds while the 
conclusion is false. Then for any K there is a '\< such
that for every j \ f(^ )> \^, as .Jc is regular. Hence, for
arbitary < K we can obtain an w  -sequence of ordinals < SC
^ ^  • • • • ( ^ )
where for every i ^  f( ^  ) > Let the supremum of (4t)
be , which is < fe by regularity, and then as f ( ^ we
have f( for some m e  u>, But then > X so that from
the definition of (%) f(¥')>^.,, which is a contradiction. Q
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Theorem 3.7 If ^  is an inaccessible cardinal, oc ^ j* and x is a 
set of cardinality less than which is contained in Raç , then 
there are s< many < k for which R^ ÿ Df (Roc ,R ^  U x ) .
Proof Let X,oc,x be as in the hypothesis of the theorem and suppose 
that there are less than iK (1*3 with the required properties.
If ^  has the required properties then put f(p ) ==• 0, and we 
complete the definition of f : jC -4 X as follows
If f(^ ) has not already been defined then
R^ £ Df(R^ >c,Rjl vj x) and put (^ ¥)
f(^ ) - the least H for v/hich R)^  €. Df(Roc ,RX V x),
It is clear that f is a regressive function on 5k so that by
theorem 3.6 there is a 6 < K  such that for K many # < f ( P ) - S  •
Further, many of these ^ ’s must have had their f value 
defined by (^ K ) so that there are %  many ordinals less than
which are in Df(RaC ,RA v x). This is impossible as there are only
countably many formulae and max( R  , x ) ( <  k as k is inaccess­
ible ) many parameters available, O
Theorem 3.8 If K  is an inaccessible cardinal and oC ^  Sc then there 
are Sc many natural models of A of the form (Roc, R^ , with
Proof This follows directly from theorem 3.2 and theorem 3*7 Q
Remark We have recently shovm that V - L implies that theorem 3.8 
is best possible, in the sense that the first inaccessible 
cardinal becomes the smallest cardinal for which the conclusion 
holds. V - L also decides some other questions about natural models 
of A and details of these results will appear elsewhere.
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In [56 3 Reinhardt asked if there is a second order vesion 
of Grevre’s theorem ( i,e. theorem 3*5 )• He made this precise in 
Question 4*13 of that paper which is
" Suppose that for every x£Rp> ^ is not definable in 
(Roc bl; 6 ;x} , Is there a such that ^ and
R p < , R & ?  ",
We can use theorem 3.7 to show that the ansv/er to this question 
is no, in general, as follows.
Let k be an inaccessible cardinal and oc ^ V., Then, by 
theorem 3*7» there is a < 5< such that for every x £ R ^  , ^ is 
not definable in ( Roc. +1, 6 ,x] • Now suppose that the answer to 
Reinhardt’s question is yes so that there is a 5 such that
|3 €. and R | R^ , Theorem 4,12 of [ 56] shows that if V - L 
holds then v/e can derive the existence of arbitarily large inaccess­
ibles in R ^  from R p <  ^ R&^  . Hence the usual consistency proof of 
ZF Inac(oC )i«V = L relative to ZF 3oclnac(oc. ) shows that we
can derive the consistency of ZF 4- Voc 3 ^  Inac ( ^  ) from the 
consistency of ZF ^  3 oclnac(oc ), This is well Icnown to be false.
Reinhardt's question is a straightfor\'/ard generalisation of 
Grewe's theorem and it still might be true that there is a less 
obvious generalisation. The reason why the original proof does 
not generalise to higher orders is that the most natural generalis­
ations of the following statement fail.
For limit'X , E=<.< EX iff i i < X -J Et i Bf(EX ,E«: )).
It might be possible to get a higher order version of this result 
by adding further conditions, which are vacuous in the first order 
case, to the right hand side.
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5.2 Bounded •upward reflection
In the theory the different constants were intended to 
represent different orders of sets. As an upward reflection 
principle is provable in A , if xCEV^ ^ ^(x,V{ ) holds in A j  then 
it seems natural to insist that there is a y of the same order as 
Y; for which Vj 6- y ^  (^(x,y) holds, 'Ihus we are led to consider 
the following principle of bounded upward reflection ( BUR ) in A^ ,
BUR. If tj} has exactly two free variables, then
^ ^ (x,V; ) -4 J y  (V; £ Y , ^ ^(x,y) ) .
Our next theorem shows that BUR is not derivable in A^ by 
constructing a natural model. This suggests that there might be 
some intuitively reasonable generalisations of A^ and we return 
to this in chapter 5« Theorem 3.10 constructs a natural model of 
A* 4- BUR using only one inaccessible cardinal.
Theorem 3.9 If there is a 1-indescribable cardinal ( see [56] for 
a definition ), then there is a natural model of in which BUR
is false.
Proof Let ^ be a 1-indescribable cardinal and we firstly show
that there is an inaccessible such that R^ *4. r 5v .
Theorem 2.2 of [45] shows that there is a normal function 
f : \ —4 X such that if (S is a fixed point of f then R ? <  R\ • 
Hence we can suppose that
( R \  4-1, " f is a normal function on \ with the above
property, and X is inaccessible ".
Then, by indescribability, there is a ^ < X for which 
R^|3i4“1,£^ ^ ” f n R p  is a normal function on with the
above property, and p is inaccessible
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It is clear that ^  is a fixed point of f so that ^  is an inaccess­
ible cardinal satisfying , as required.
Theorem 3*4 shows that (R\,Rp ,6^ A, Let be the least
inaccessible cardinal greater than ^ and then theorem 3»8 shows 
that there is an (h>fl)-sequence of ordinals
„ <  ^
all between ^ and , satisfying (RX»RJ>t, ê') f  A  for all i£ tc>tl. 
Then ^RX,R^,RS_^, . . . H 6 ) is a natural model of A ^  
in which Vq Rx:^nac(<3c) holds but 3  "€ e  V. ^ Inac(^ ))
fails. Thus BUR is false, Q
Theorem 3.10 There is a natural model of aJ[ i* EUR.
Proof Let %  be an inaccessible cardinal so theorem 3.8 shows 
3  k (Rk»Rjfl,^^ >=• A. UR holds in this model so that for any 
formula with exactly two free variables
Rk. ^ x6Rji^ {6(x;R^ ) -4 3z (R/S £ z^ (x,z)).
Let the supremum of the least ranks of such z*s ( over all x £ R p  
and all suitable formulae ^  ) be and then aCj <  ^  as k is 
inaccessible. Using theorem 3.8 again, let be the least ordinal 
greater than ‘c< ^ for which <fRx,R/3j,£^ f-* A, Then use R^ as 
V^ . , R|l^ as and iterate the above construction to obtain a 
natural model of with domain R K  . Clearly BUR holds in this 
model, Û
3.3 Some questions of Reinhardt's
Theorem 3.11 answers question 4.14 of [.56] negatively.
This, in turn, shows that theorem 3.9 of [^56] cannot be improved 
to a version without a parameter, ansv/ering another question of 
Reinhardt's, It is noted in [ 56] that question 4.14 is equiva­
lent to asking v/hether or not the schema
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xeVg^-4 ( 6 (x) 4-) 6'^(x))
is provable in , where 0 is a formula with exactly one free 
variable.
Theorem 3 «11 Let ^  be the sentence 3 ^  Inac({’l). Then there is 
a natural model in which ( is false.
Proof We construct a natural model of A ^  in which and '4^ ^»
hold. Let Ko, be the first two inacessible cardinals. Then, 
by theorem 3.8, there is a model of A of the form kx ,RKi> 
virith oC^< As in the proof of theorem 3.9 we can then find an 
(uj 4 l)-sequence of ordinals oC;*„ all between and  ^, such
that (R K , ,R(Ko , , , , A'^ . In this model
Vj Inac( pk ) and 3 p £ Inac ( ^  ) so that as Vç, and are 
supertransitive, and hold, Q
Our next result proves Conjecture 4.16(b) of [56] , again by 
using our natural model methods.
Theorem 3.12 A4ZF is not finitely axiomatisable over A,
Proof Suppose that ^5, , , . ^  are axioms of ZF. We construct 
a natural model ^R^ ,R ^ ^  of A4 D, 4 . . .4 where 
is not a model of ZF, and the theorem will then follow.
Let %  be the least inaccessible cardinal and let oC be the 
least ordinal greater than for which (R^C, $ )p- ZF. Using the 
reflection principle for ZF we then see that in R&c
3 ^ (4^)
Let be the least ordinal which satisfies the bracketed part of 
( >k) in ROC. Then, by theorem 3.8, there is a h  < satisfying 
(R(^,R^ ,<J.> V=A, Now ( r 3 , € > ^  from (^), but
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ZP from the definition of ^ so that this model is as 
required. Q
In proving theorem 3,12 one of the facts which we used is that 
if & is a sentence and ZP V 0 then
V x l y  (x^ jcy (=. 9 r\ ZP)g we constructed y using
a reduction of the length of the universe. A n analogous v/idth 
reducing principle for Z would he
If B  is a sentence and Z k B then
Vx3y  (xCy^ <y»<c> 1=^ e A ( y , & )  M  z ) .
We cannot yet prove (%. ), but we end this section by showing 
that if its true then it ansværs another of Reinhardt's questions.
It also seems possible that further results about one theory not 
being finitely axiomatisable over another can be obtained by these 
methods as problems of equiconsistency arc avoided by constructing 
models in a stronger theory. Question 4.22 of [56] is
" T will be a theory formulated in a language with 6 and 
individual constants (né</^). The axioms of T include ( for 
each n ) the pairing, union and power set axioms relativised to , 
a comprehension axiom for each V-^  and an axiom 6 Is Tf-Z
finitely axiomatisable over T ? ”,
We answer this question negatively, subject to 9 as
follows. Let , , , 9^ be axioms of Z and then, using ,
let y be such that Ruc^ S.y, ^y,<^ ^ 0, A' ' \
^  Z. Then by taking R^*-’ +i as V; we see that ^y,&') 
gives a model for T, , . .9^, but not for Z, as required.
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Remark It is knov/n that Z is not finitely axiomatisable ( see 
Montague's paper Semantic closure and non-finite axiomatisability I, 
in Infinitistic Methods, Pergamon Press, I96I ), but this result 
does not seem to give directly.
3*4 Existence of more natural models
Theorem 3*8 shows that given a large oc , there are many ^ s 
for which (R.  ^A and in this section we consider the possibility 
of finding results of the form ' given a certain p , there are many 
ccs for which 1® A ', Most of the proofs in this section are 
just outlines as otherwise we would have to give a full treatment 
of absoluteness conditions, as is done in [ 22] ,
Definition 3.15 p is said to be suitable if 2  &  kA.
U(^ ) - {cc \ R   ^a ) ,
E(A) - { ^ ]  R p < R ^ ]  .
Our use of U(p) and E( ^  ) will be quite loose as these abbre­
viations stand for sets, virtual classes ( in the sense of Quine, 
see [33] ) and proper classes at different times. We hope that
the reader can see which use is intended from the context.
Theorem 3.14 p is suitable iff 3c<r > ^  R^ <  Rac .
Proof If p is suitable then theorem 3.3 shows that 3 > p Rp-KRtf 
Theorem 3,4 implies the other half of this theorem, Q
Theorem 3,13 If K is an inaccessible cardinal, then there are 
^  many p < for which U(^ ) is unbounded.
Proof Let K  be an inaccessible cardinal and we suppose that there
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are less than X  many p <  for which TJ(p ) is unbounded. Let \  
be the supremum of
i, i 3P<.-îit ( ^ A ^ U( p) is bounded ) j ,
Then by theorem 3.8 there are X many p < %  for which
^R\ ,R'^  ; 6^ Ip A so that there are ^  many p ^  % for which
U( p ) is unbounded. This contradicts our assumption so that the
theorem holds, O
Corollary 3.16 If K is an inaccessible cardinal, then there are 
X inany p ^  for which | oC 6 U( ^  ) ^ocis a limit ordinal} 
is unbounded.
Proof If ^Ra>J^-V n,R  ^A then, by theorem 3.1,
R P Df (Ruj^n,Rpj) so that R^^Df(Ru;^ ,Rj3), By theorem 3*2 
(Rcu^ ,Rp,6') ^ A 80 that the corollary follows from the theorem, D
Theorem 3*15 shows that for many suitable p s U(p) will be 
unbounded, but the next result shows that this will not be true of 
all suitable p s.
Theorem 3.17 V  £ 3 ? >  g ( ) = %).
Proof Choose G ,¥ and let x  be the least inaccessible cardinal 
which is greater than max( 6 , ^ ), Then, by theorem 3.15, there is 
a p ' with max( ^  ^  ' e  S< and U( p * ) unbounded. Thus there
is a p which satisfies
where we assume that ( ^ )  is written in a way which does not
assume U ( ^ ) to be a set.
Now let $ be the least ordinal which satisfies (>k), and if
U( p ) > ^  , let ^  be the ¥^ th, member, of U( P ) under the natural
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ordering. If ¥ is a successor ordinal then p will he definable 
in RoC using (’^ ), which uses 8» ,¥ as parameters. By theorem 3,1 
this contradicts 6^ ^ A, If ¥ is a limit ordinal then it is 
straightforward to see that p is definable in Roc , in terms of 5,
¥, using
0 there is a set of ordinals ^  for which
^  ^  A and the order type of the set, under 6 , is ^ )  »
Again, this contradicts theorem 3.1 Q
Tlieorom 3.14 characterised suitable ordinals and it might 
suggest that U(P) ” looks like " E(P), but our next theorem shows
that this is not true from the point of view of order types.
Theorem 3.18 If k is the first inaccessible cardinal and % k ,
then 3  P ( b(T) - k t- E(pl +Ü  ).
Proof Choose and then, by theorem 3.15, there is a p '
with ¥ <  p * < K and U( p ' ) unbounded, E( P ' ) C  *•' as -i 3 cc Inac(ac )
is true in R p» ‘, so that there is a P ’ which satisfies
Ûïjî)'? f % (*)
where ( is written in a way which does not assume U(|3) is a
set.
Let p be the least ordinal which satisfies ) and put 
- X + E( p )4- ¥ . Now suppose that U(p ) and let £C be the 
Vj, th, member of U( p ), under the natural ordering. Then we can
get a contradiction as in the proof of theorem 3.17. O
Theorem 3.18 admits some generalisations, but this method does 
not seem to give results of the form V ¥ 3 ^ (  ~ E(P)i-¥ ),
The main trouble seems to be our lack of knowledge about the 
structure of E(p ) and we return to this problem in chapter 7.
-  29 -
Although U( ^  ) and E(^) can he quite different, theorem 3*4 
shows that E(p ) C  u(p ), If there are ordinals p , ¥, G for which 
r ¥ < R ^  then theorem 3.4 shows that E( p ) need not he an 
initial segment of U(P ), but this leads to our next question.
Question 3.19 Is ■^cC+-¥\ -K y Roc} an initial segment
of U ( p ) ?
3.5 'Jlie smallest natural model of A
In this section we just note that there is a reasonable 
definition of a smallest natural model of A,
Definition 3.20 ^  j C Is that natural model of A
determined by letting be the least ordinal for which
3 ^  ^ R*^m| ,R P , < z y (= A [" 3 ÛC ,R p a"] and letting
M Ml be the least ordinal for which ^RoC^^^,R M A
^ y A^ •
Theorem 3.21 Ss^ss ' .
Proof From the definitions ^ pr-t and ^ n % Suppose
that 0C|^ , < and then is definable in Rx^^jSo that from
theorem 3.5 ^R R ?hi» ^ h  A, which contradicts the definition
of Thus c and hence . Cl
We now put *’® hi and we call the smallest
natural model of A. It is also straightforward to see that
are the least ordinals ( again, it makes no difference which 
order these are taken in ) for which R p m  R'^N.
Rp^f is appreciably larger than the smallest natural model 
of ZP and we can see this as follows. As R K  R-^h, R^m is
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larger than the ¥ th, natural model of ZP for any ¥  . Hence
there are natural models of ZP smaller than R {1^% . But
is not the first natural model of ZP with this property as
^ Df(R‘>''1^ ,R )• Consequently, there are smaller natural
models of ZP each having this property, etc, etc.
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Chapter 4 
The set theory A"*"
4,1 Background
The set theory A"*" was introduced in as an alternative
way of formalising Ackermann's principle that ” the collection of 
all sets is not sharply delimited ”, Reinliardt interpreted this 
by suggesting that there are different classes , all
of which are possible candidates for ” the class of all sets ", 
Then, to interpret the principle that " sharply delimited 
collections of sets are sets ", he suggested that if the extension 
of ïj6(V)^t'teV is independent of which candidate V is, then 
y6(V) /^t6 V can be used as an abstraction terra. Parameters in this 
expression are assumed to be sets, as in A,
In the formal theory only two possible classes of all sets
are considered, and we have constants V and V* for them. The only
predicate is C  . Tbe axioms of A'^  are WB-^ (V) together with
A4^ If (6 has exactly four free variables, then
x,y€V A V t  (^(V,x,y,t) ,^te V e  <f(V',x,y,t) ,^t£V») ^
3 z ev Vt (t€z4->te ^(v,x,y,t)),
A6 V S  V  .
In £56^ Reinhardt indicates that
(i) A*(: AT,
(ii) A'^'hVeV,
(iii) A'^  is consistent if + the following schema 
of indescribability is consistent,
x,y ^(V,x,y)-> I v e V  (v,xOv,yA v) (l)
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We shall use (i) and (ii) without explicitly mentioning them,
(iii), together with the result of [58] , shows that if ZF t 
' there is a Ramsey cardinal ' is consistent, then so is ,
However, it did not seem very likely that A"*" was much stronger than 
A and we confirm this in the next section.
For A, we can see that V cannot he definable in terms of ç , 
but this proof does not work for V  in A ^ : we shall exploit this
fact in the next section.
Theorem 4,1 shows that a bounded upward reflection principle 
( see section 3.2 ) is provable in A*^  , This shows that V ’ cannot 
be defined using a certain type of expression and that V  must be 
* quite a bit ' larger than V, The proof of the theorem is an 
extension of Reinhardt's proof of (ii).
Theorem 4.1 A"*" K x,y^ V ^  ^  (x,y,V)'^3 z (V€ z 6 V'yy, zC ^  (x,y,z)),
Proof We work in A^ , Suppose that x,yérV and (x,y,V) holds.
Then, by considering the dovmward reflection scheme, we know that
V = (t * 3 P 6 7  (<^(x,y,Rp ) ^ t€:R^€ V ^ R p  Q  V) . (2)
If we also have
V = {t I a P G V  (^(x,y,R^)^teEpe V'/, Rf Ç.V') , (3)
then from (2), (3) and A4'*'we obtain V&.V, This is a contradiction 
as it implies the existence of the Russell set. Hence there is a
^ for which Rp ^  V and R^ € V  ^  ^  (x,y,R^ )a ^  V  . From ‘ 
the development of ordinal theory which is given in [56] we know 
that if R p, ^  V, then V € R p  , so that Rp can be used as z in the 
conclusion of the theorem, D
4,2 The strength of A"^
The main result of this section is corollary 4.7, which shows 
that the set theoretic part of A*^  ( i.e. A^ | V ) is precisely ZF,
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On the to this result we also show that if a theory is an 
extension of A*" with a definable class ( i.e. definable by an € 
formula ) which contains V, then the ( € ,V)-theorems of this theory 
include those of A"*" ( this is theorem 4.2 ); and that it is 
relatively consistent with that there is a class x satisfying 
\/y y& X ( this is theorem 4.4» essentially ), All Ackermann-type 
set theories are assumed to have the appropriate language in this 
section.
Theorem 4.2 If ^  is a formula with exactly one free variable, then 
A^-r '^x (x€ V  v>i-'(x)) r V x e  V-^Cx) t'A"**,
Proof \Te need only show that A4^^ is derivable in the given theory
and we do this as follows.
In the given theory we can replace x € V  by '^(x) and V* %  x
by 3t (Vx (xfet^*^(x)) A t ^ x), We suppose that the ^ -formula
obtained from P^(V',V) by such replacements is Then an
instance of the hypothesis of A4"*" becomes
x,y£.V^Vt (^(V,x,y,t) ,^t^ V ^^(x,y,t) ^ '("(t) ),
,^ (x,y, t) ,\"^(t) is an 6 -formula, \  (x,y,t) say, so that væ have 
x,y6 V ^ V t  (x,y,t)t€V).
The conclusion of A4 then follows by applying A4 to the formula 
, as required, Q
Lemma 4.3 If ^  is a sentence, T^ is the theory with axioms A1-A4, 
and 3u u€ X-^x^ X ^ B u ^ x V t C u  t^x, andT^t'^'^ then ZF k ^  .
Proof This result follows directly from the proof of theorem 1
of [38] . Q
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Theorem 4*4 ^ is the theory -f' 3 x V y  y £  x and T^ is consistent,
then T is also consistent.
interpret T in and we use ^ , V as the basic symbols 
of T and as those of T^, is the empty set of T^, ^
is and t ij> is ^ l*' : these sets being defined
using 6 The membership relation is defined by
y e r - ÿ i f f  yt^i*^ ,
y €% iff y 6^x, in all other cases.
We also put T =  ?^ - ( & TC(x)J ), where TC(i)
is the transitive closure of x in T, The membership part of this
interpretation is similar to an idea used in [ll] .
It now remains to show that the interpretations of the axioms 
of T hold in T^, The axiom of foundation guarantees this for Al, 
and we obviously have the interpretation of 3xVy y £  x holding.
It is also clear that for every 6 -formula there is an equiv­
alent 6 ^ -formula, say, and that for every ( 6 ,7 )-formula &, 
there is an equivalent ( ^ ^,7^)-formula, say.
To show that the interpretation of an instance of A2 holds 
for a formula î  , we just need to use (x €-7^C in A2, Now
suppose that x^7 and we prove the interpretation of A3. If y 6 X,
then from the definition of 7 and as TC(y) Q. TC(x) we get y 6 7,
If yGx, then y ^^7^ by A3, y f f {  ^  being the empty set defined 
using ) as 7^ is not a member of any of its members and 
TC(y)£TC(x), Hence we have y € 7  from the definition of 7.
Now suppose that the hypothesis of A4 holds for a formula , 
i.e. x , y 6 7 A V t  (4^(x,y,t)-4t67). (4)
Then we also have x,y ^ ^7^ t (-^^(x,y,t) -^t€^7^), so that by 
A4 7^Vt ( te^z«-*>‘^^(x,y,t)). If z »  , then
V t  ( t E zV^tfe ) so that the interpretation of the
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conclusion of A4 holds in this instance. Thus v/e can assume that 
Vt ( t £  ^  tçz ) and z , If (^^TC(z), then for some
y E 0 *^ P  ^ ^8(y) which contradicts (4), Hence z 6 V and the inter­
pretation of A4 holds.
Similar, straightforward arguments show that the interpretation 
of A5 also holds, D
Corollary 4,5 If ^  is a sentence and T , then T^ V ^  •
Proof 5y inspection of the construction used in the proof of the
theorem, it is straightforward to check that there is a natural 
isomorphism between V and 7^, so that the corollary holds. Q
Theorem 4.6 If ZP is consistent, then A'*' is also consistent.
Proof Suppose that ZF is consistent. Lemma 4,3 and theorem 4*4 
then show that T is also consistent, V/e can use T in theorem 4*2 
by taking ^  as x»x, so that, by that theorem, A’*' is also 
consistent, Q
Corollary 4.7 If ^  is a sentence, then A^ \t  iff ZF Ir ^ ,
Proof By theorem 4.2, corollary 4.5 and lemma 4,3 we see that if
A"** V’ , then ZF b ^  . The converse follows from the main result
of [ 56] . Q
In [56], Reinhardt asked if At-1 (l) is stronger than A"*".
Theorem 4,6 answers this question positively, provided that ZF is
consistent, as the existence of inaccessible cardinals, for 
instance, is derivable in a4* -V (l).
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4*3 Reflection principles
In the last section we showed that it is relatively consistent 
with for V  to be definable in terms of € , but our next theorem 
shows that V cannot be defined in terms of 6 and This leads
us to show ( in theorems 4*9 and 4*10 ) that extended reflection 
principles are provable in A^ , in which V  can be used as a 
parameter. Then we show that A"^  can be axiomatised using the 
extended downward reflection principle in place of A4 , This is 
analogous to the situation in A, v/here the corresponding result 
was proved in [40J ,
Theorem 4.8 If is a formula with exactly four free variables, 
then A''* x,y6V -»Vt ( t & V  ^  i^(x,y,V' ,t) ),
Proof Suppose that x,y^ V and that for a suitable
Vt ( tevtt f(x,y,V',t) ). (5)
Firstly we will shov/ that
V t € V  4"(x,y,V,t), (6)
Suppose that (6) does not hold so that for some t’ .^ V, we have 
“n r|^(x,y,V, t* ), Now consider the formula
X ‘(x,y,X,t',t) * (n '\}'(x,y,X,t’)A t<fX )^( ^(xjyjXjtOy^'jf^CxjyjXjt) ),
Then
X(x,y,V,t* ,t)<-^t£ V follows from (6),
,t' ,t)V» t£ V follows from (5),
Using A4'*' with X(x,y,V, t',t) gives VCV, a contradictiion,
so that we loiow (6) holds. Then
(x,y,V,t) t£ V follows from (6),
i^(x,y,V',t) A tev’O t e v  follows from (5).
Using A4'*’ again we get a contradiction. Hence (5) is false 
and the theorem holds, Q
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Theorem 4.9 Extended downv;ard reflection.
If <j) is a formula with exactly four free variables, then 
A*** h x,y€ <j>(x,y,V,V*)-^ 3 z e V  jfe (x,y,z,V),
Proof Suppose that x,y£V, ^(x,y,V,V) and 3 z eV ^(x,y,z,V») 
Then, by the usual theory of odrinals in , we have 
tE ’ t£RcC'j where oc is the least ordinal for which
x,yeRoC and ^(x,y,ROc,V') »
^  'V'(x,y,V»,t), say.
This contradicts theorem 4.8, so that the result holds. Q
Theorem 4.10 Extended upward reflection.
If is a formula with exactly four free variables, then
A'^  V x,y£ p  (x,y V,V‘) 3 z  ( z é V ’ ^  (x,y,z,V) ).
Proof Suppose that x,y£V, ^ (x,y,V,V ) and 3 z ( 76 z £7 ’/%^ 
z G7',\ P  (x,y,z,7’). Then,as in the proof of the last theorem, 
we have
t6 7 ' tERoC, where oC is the supremum of those ordinals
for which x,yé Roc and R»C 6-7’ Roc ^  <p (x,y,E^ ,7' ) . 
The result then follows from theorem 4*8. Q
Theorem 4.11 A"*" can be axiomatised using the extended downward
reflection principle in place of k 4 ^  .
Proof We need only show that A4"*" is provable from the other 
axioms of k ^  and the extended downward reflection scheme.
Suppose that an instance of the hypothesis of A4 holds, 
i.e. x,yE7A Vt ((^(x,y,7,t)Ate70 ^(x,y,7’,t) A.te7' ).
Then, by A2, 3z <G7Vt ( t£ z 16 7 ’a  ^  (x,y,7‘, t) ). Applying 
extended downward reflection to this formula gives
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3 w6 V 3 z4 wVt ( te ^ (x,y,V',t) i.
Hence, by A3,
3 zE V Vt ( t c z O t E V * ^  (x,y,V ,t) ^
and we immediately get the conclusion of A4*’from this, Q
The last theorem in this section gives another alternative 
axiomatisation of A't" , This one is more akin to the original system 
A, It shows that the only additional assumption in A"*" is that 
there is a class containing V which can be used as a parameter in 
A4.
Theorem 4.12 A'*' can be axiomatised using the following schema
in place of A4*^  •
If ^  is a formula with exactly four free variables, then
x,y£V  ^ V t  ( (x,y,V',t) 4 t EV ) 3 z  eV Vt ( t £ z 4 4  ^(x,y,V ,t))
A.
Proof Firstly, we show that the above schema is provable in A , 
Suppose that x,y£ V ^  V t  ( ^(x,y,V*,t)4 t£: V ), and then by A2 
3z G  V Vt (t & z <4^(x,y,V' ,t). The result then follows as in the 
proof of theorem 4.11.
Now suppose that this schema holds, and we prove A4'*".
Suppose that the hypothesis of A4'*" holds for a suitable f o r m u l a . 
Then we just need to apply this schema to the formula 
■^(x,y,V',t) Q
4.4 Natural models
Natural models of A*** are models of this theory which are of 
the form <^R^C,R^ ,r¥, € ^R'^') , where Rec is the domain of the 
model, R(1 is the interpretation of V  and R)jf is the interpretation 
of V, We extend our conventions about natural models of A to 
those of AT and we use À  for the structure ^ R ^ , R ^  ,R¥ ,e') ,
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in which we assume tac. )> > ¥,
Our first theorem is directly analogous to theorem 3.1, 
and theorem 4.14 gives a precise characterisation of the natural 
models of A'*’ . We shall not include full details of absoluteness 
considerations in the proofs of these results.
Theorem 4.13 If O v ^  , then U is not definable
in <(b,U*,U,E'^ by an 6 -formula with parameters from Ü U “(U’] •
Proof Suppose that the hypothesis of the theorem holds, but that 
the conclusion is false. Then, for some elements x,y of U and some 
formula , we have
t £ U  iff Ca F^(x,y,t,ïï'), (7)
where all free variables are shown and we confuse objects with 
their names. Then Cx )=x,y£V,\Vt ( ÿ(x,y,V*,t) ->téV ), so 
that, by theorem 4.12, we get
Ovk x,y6 7^3 z67Vt ( t£ z ^(x,y,7' ,t) ).
From (7) we then see that Cv 7E7, which is impossible, Q
Theorem 4.14 If ^Df(R&c,R¥ U ^ Rf} ) and cc > |S > ¥ , then
â  Y  ^  •
Proof Suppose that and R¥ Df(R<^,R¥ u  {.R^} )•
It is clear that v/e need only show that A4'*' holds in ^  , Hence, 
by theorem 4.11, it suffices to show that the extended do^vnward 
reflection principle holds in ,
Suppose that <jC is a limit ordinal and that for some x,y6' R¥ 9 
Z  V p  (x,y,7,7'). Then if ^  ^  3  z 6 7^  (x,y,z,7* ) we would have 
^  y  ' 7 ir R¥. , where is the least ordinal for which x,y6 R ^
and p  (x,y,R¥ ,V) '.
This contradicts our assumption so the result holds when cc pg a
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limit ordinal, IfoC s > n then it is straightforward to 
modify the above proof by relativising V x R>$ to R w ^  . Q
QoP-2ll.aiX,4>,b5, Ii <Roc,R¥,e> A, cc> ¥  and p e  Df(R«,R%), 
then k A"*" .
This follows directly from theorem 3*2 and the theorem, Q
Our next result is analogous to part of theorem 3.3. Theorem 
4,17 extends the method of obtaining natural models of A, which we 
introduced in the last chapter, to those of A"*" .
Theorem 4,16 If ^ A'*’ , and £Df(Roc ,R)^  ), then
<Rc<*,R^,r¥ ,6>  K A*- .
Proof Suppose that the hypothesis of the theorem holds while the 
conclusion fails. Then R^ 6 Df (Roc ' ,R¥ v £ R^j ) so that 
R ¥ £ Df (Rpc ,R¥ U'tRp} ), as ' 6 Df(Roc,R& ), This contradicts 
theorem 4.14. C3
Theorem 4,17 If ^ is an inaccessible cardinal and âC 
then there are K  many ordinals ¥ for which ^ A"*" .
Proof Tliis follows from theorems 3*7 and 4.14. Q
The original idea behind A"*" was that V  would be an alternative 
candidate for the class of all sets. However, theorem 4,17 enables 
us to construct natural models of A'*' in v/hich V  can be any Rj^, 
where ^ is greater than the first inaccessible cardinal. We shall 
consider other ways of formalising the notion of a class being an 
alternative candidate for the class of all sets in chapter 5*
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Next we shall compare the natural, models of A"** with those of A*
Theorem 4.18 If /& W A+ , then < R ? , r ¥ , 6> Y A.
Proof Suppose that Then R ¥ ^  Df(Rcc ,r ¥ U -{r ^} ),
from theorem 4.12, and hence R¥ ^  Df(Rp. ,R¥ ), as required. U
If ^R(x.',Rp ,€ > V A and <^Roc,Rp', e > t= A where p.* > P 
then it might seem plausible that ^R<^,Rp',Rp ,6 ^ A^ , but
we next give a counterexample to this.
Let Ra«i,Rp,R¥ be the first three natural models which are 
elementary substructures of R X , where if is the first inaccessible 
cardinal. Then <^ R ¥,RP ,E'> A and ^R¥,Ror, £') A as 
Rûc-4R^^R¥, However, Roc £Df(R'{^,Roc u (_R^} ) as oc is " the 
largest ordinal ^  for which R(, X R P  ", so that by theorem 4.13 
<RX ,Rfi,E.C,6.>j|i A-*- .
Consideration of the smallest natural model of A shows that 
there are set universes which occur in natural models of A but not 
in those of A'^  . In theorem 4.20 we note that the smallest natural 
set universes of various theories form a strictly increase sequence.
It is amusing to note that the provable set theoretic statements of 
all the theories mentioned in that theorem are the same, so that 
from a natural model point of view v/hat constitutes a smallest 
natural set universe depends heavily on the formalism used.
Definition 4.19 The smallest natural set universe of an appropriate 
set theory is Roc, where oC is the least ordinal for which there is 
a natural model of the theory in which R oC is the class of all sets 
( or domain, if the theory has no proper classes ).
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Theorem _4..20 The smallest natural set universes of the theories 
ZF, A, A"*" , and NBG form a strictly increasing sequence of sets.
Proof In section 3.5 we noted this result for ZF and A. Let 
he the smallest natural set universe of A'*' . Then if 
^ M ^ a"* , theorem 4.18 shows that
^ A, Hence , the smallest natural model of A,
will be definable in any natural model of so that ^ ^
Now the second part of the theorem holds. Theorem 4» 17 shows that 
is an accessible ordinal. It is well kno\m that the smallest 
natural set universe of NBG is Rx, where X  is the first inaccess­
ible cardinal, so that the last part also holds, O
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Chapter 5 
Some Ackermann-type set theories
Iii m
In section 4*1 we discussed the motivation behind the theory 
A^ . Some of the later results of chapter 4 suggest that the 
objectives of A"^  have not been reached in the formal theory.
ATI is an Ackermann-type set theory which is based on only part of 
the intuition which led to A”*" « We again suppose that V and V  
are alternative candidates for the class of all sets, both of them 
being models of a Zermelo-type theory so that they are much 
" larger " than all of their members. Consequently, we include 
among the axioms of ATI,
To express the idea that V and V ’ are equally good choices 
from the point of view of E  -formulae we assume that they have 
the same 6.-properties. As it is natural to allow parameters from 
V in this schema, it becomes
x,yEV-^( (p (x,y,V) E4  ^ (x,y,V) ),
Finally, v/e suppose tliat VEV* as V* is the larger candidate.
We have not considered formalising Ackermann's idea that " well 
determined collections of sets are sets " within this system.
Definition 5.1 ATI is a theory with language E,V,V’, Its axioms 
are WD^(v), V  and the schema
(ATI) If is a formula with exactly three free variables, then 
x,yEV -4( ^  (x,y,V) <4 <^(x,y,V') ).
Next we note that A"* SrATl. This result had previously 
been observed by Reinhardt in a different context.
Theorem 5.2 If A**" I- ^(V,V) then ATI ^(V,7').
-  44 -
need only show that A4'*' is provable in ATI, so we suppose
that x.yeV^ Vt (i(x,y,v,t) ^ teVfc^ ^ (x,y,?',t) ^ t e V  ).
Then, hy A2, 3zS,YVt ( t£ z ^ (x,y,Y> ,t) ^ t e V  ), Ely AJ and 
(ATI) we have z « Y  t V » z  6 Y ’, and hence we have 
I z e V ' V t  ( t£ Z£^ ^ (x,y,Y',t) ^ t€Y' ),
Applying (ATI) to this sentence gives the required result. Ü
From theorem 5.2 we know, very indirectly, that 2p V  q,g
derived in ATI. Theorem 5-3 shows that this can be proved straight­
forwardly, without using the axiom of foundation, and that the 
existence of arbitarily large natural models of ZF is derivable in 
ATI, We find it interesting that the motivation behind ATI leads 
to the latter result.
Theorem 5.3 (i) If ^  is a sentence and ZF V* ^ , then ATI t ,
(ii) ATI b ( Y'oc 3 p h ZF ) , and further
ATI b Vocev V <ocV».
Proof (i) If ^ is a formula with exactly one free variable and 
A h^(V), then from theorem 5*2 ATl\-^(v), Hence, by the easy 
proofs given by Ackermann in [l] , it only remains to show that 
replacement holds v/hen relativised to V, Suppose that 
x,y£ V u  e V 3 Ite V (x,y,u, t) and then, as in the proof of 
theorem 5,2, B z e V ' V t  ( t€ z S u E x  )• From (ATI) we have 
so that replacing by and using (ATI) again
we get the required result,
(ii) We can work in classes " above " V  in exactly the 
same way that we worked in classes above V in A^ . Formalising 
the proof of (i) in such a class shows that V^ ZF can be derived 
in ATI. Hence the first result follows by the dov/nward reflection
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principle. To obtain the second result, we just need to work an 
appropriate distance above V  and relativise in the obvious way.
As V , for all €.7, it seems quite likely that it will
be difficult to give an extension of ZF which is the set theoretic 
part of ATI, for we do not know how strong the condition 
is. Another question is
Question 3.4 Is strong replacement provable in ATI ?
Theorems 5*2 and 4*1 show that bounded upward reflection is 
provable in ATI, The next theorem shows that, analogously to 
theorem 2,8, there is no proof-theoretic weakening of ATI by our 
considering only two possible set universes. Consequently, we 
suggest that ATI is an improvement on A^  , as well as on A"*" .
Theorem 3.5 If 7; are constants ( for ié-oc ) and we add to 
(7) the axioms i < j < o c 7 !c.7,‘ E 7^  and 
x,yE7 *4( ^  (x,y,7) ^(x,y,7^* ) ) ( for ie°C and p  any
formula with 5 free variables ) then this theory b 
iff AT1\^7,7').
Proof (Outline) Suppose that the hypothesis of the theorem holds 
for a formula "f’, Let i^ < i* . . . i-^  be the indices of the 
7 s which occur in the axioms used in a proof of '{^ (7,7^).
The upward reflection principle holds for 7^^  ^ so the instances 
of those axioms akin to (ATI) involving 7;^  can be replaced by 
those which involve only 7^  ^  » Iterating this process as in the 
proof of theorem 4.5 [5¥] gives the result, Q
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pefinition 5»6 AIR is the theory A'^  augmented hy the following 
schema of indescribable replacement,
(IR) If B is a formula with exactly three free variables, then 
x,y S: VA ^(V,x,y) 3 v E V  9(v,xAv,yAv).
Theorem 3«7 shows that the consistency of AIR implies the 
consistency of ATI, so that by the result of [38] , if ZPi- 
there is a Ramsey cardinal is consistent, then so is ATI, The 
proof which we give is due to Reinhardt and we include it as it has 
not been published.
Theorem 3.7 If AIR is consistent, then so is ATI. u
Proof By compactness and consideration of the axioms of A^it 
suffices to show that if ^  is a formula with exactly two free 
variables, then AIR ^  3 v £ V V t £ v  ( p  (t,v) (-4 ^  (t,V) ), To show 
this, note that 3x G  V V t E  V ( <^(V,t)<^t£x ), and applying 
(IR) with X as a parameter we get 3 v 6 V Vt € v ( ^ (v, t) <4 t£x a v ), 
as required, C3
3.2 AT2
In A4 the parameters must be sets although it seems natural 
to allow certain classes as well. Such classes cannot be too 
" close " to V ( e.g. not V-3 ) or have a structure from which V  
can be extracted ( e.g. not oc v , for any ordinal cC ), In this 
section we suggest one way of approaching this idea and we restrict 
our attention to classes x ^  V, Then if ^  (y,t) ~4tEV, for all 
y 3  X, we allow ^(x,t) to be used as an abstraction term. This 
was partially inspired by Poincare's notion of predicativity, 
although it certainly does not follow from it.
The formal system AT2 is set up as an extension of WB^(V),
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Its only other axiom schema is as follows. We include parameters 
from V for convenience,
CA, If is a formula with exactly four free variables, then 
x , y e V A P < ^ V A V q  ( p G  Vt(^ (x,y,q,t) ^  tfi V ) ) -4
3z e V Vt ( t £ z C4 ^  (x,y,p, t) ),
The next result shows that strong replacement is straightfor­
wardly provable in AT2 and theorem 5.9 strengthens this.
Theorem 5.6 Strong replacement for V is provable in AT2,
Proof Suppose that for some p C  V we have x £ V u £  x 3iv (u,v)c.p. 
Let çj(x,p,t) be the formula
V u t  X 3îv ^u,v¥ £ p ^ 3 u E  X (u, t"^  € p, 
and now suppose that p S q  and ^ (x,q,t). Then 
Vu£xVv( ^u,v^ E p 44 u^,v^6q) so that tG V and the hypothesis 
of CA is satisfied. The conclusion of CA shows that strong replace­
ment for V holds, D
Theorem 5.9 AIR ^AT2.
Proof We need only show that IR is provable in AT2 and it clearly 
suffices to prove a version of IR which has only one parameter. 
Suppose that x C  8 (V,x) holds. We may then also suppose that 
X ^ V, as otherwise the result follows from the downward reflection 
scheme. Now suppose that the conclusion of IR is false, so that
(Roc,xARoc).
Put y =: { <ec, qz)l> I = E«'Ax) and let j^(x,y) te
a formula which asserts that
\\
/V
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3 t (  fi£(> 3 z Î. R P  y( p.) »
X ^  u { z \ - i ? e i  y ( p )  =  >  ).
Then we have f(x,y) ^^(v,i). Let 6(q,t) be the formula 
3 x  (*')“(x',q) ^  N/1^(^(R)$ ,x'A ) -^ t£ R^ ) ), and we next prove 
V l  ( ySuq-4 Vt  ( 0  (q,t) - i t e Y  ) ). (^)
Suppose that y C  q and G  (q,t) hold. Then 3 ix'-^Kx',t), and let 
x' be this set, q is a function from an ordinal ^ and y G q  so 
that if V = , we have ^  E £• Prom the definition o f i t  is
also clear that xTvRftS-^y so that ^ (R%,x'n R^) holds. Hence 
t e V and holds.
Using CA and (^) we obtain
] z E V V t  ( t e z M  8 ( x , t )  ) .
From our assumption that V ¥ £ V-i p { R %  ,xf\R¥) and the 
definition of B we get B(x,t)o tôV, Hence, from V 6 V
which is a contradiction. Q
Theorem 5.11 gives a weak relative consistency result for 
AT2, but we leave open the next question.
Question 5.10 How strong is AT2 ?
Theorem 5,11 Suppose that oc and g are ordinals with and
that there is an elementary embedding jsR^1-l"4 RiX-vi which is 
fixed on R^ and has «c.Then ^Rc< 1 1»R^ » êt'7 Y  AT2,
Proof Let , p,j be as in the statement of the theorem. From 
theorem 5.4 we need only show that CA holds in ^Ro: ^  1»R)^ •
Suppose that, in this model, x "zr V and
V p  ( x G p  - 4 \ / t  ( ^‘ ( q , t ) - ^  t E V  ) ) ( w e  are ig n o rin g  param eters
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from V for convenience ). Then x C  j(%) and, in the model, we 
have Vt ( ÿ ( j (%), t) 4  t ), Comprehension then gives 
■{.b I j(x), t) ^  Ê R p t IQRoc a j(v), and as j is an elementary 
embedding, we obtain { t ( j$(x,t)} £ V, as required. □
3.3 Weak forms of Ackermann-type set theories
In the original motivation for A it was asserted that the 
notion of a set is not " sharply delimited " and one way of 
interpreting this would be to ensure that there are collections 
which may or may not be sets. Consequently, there may be no class 
of all sets and we shall therefore return to Ackermann's original 
formulation of A with the predicate M(x) for " x is a set " instead 
of the constant V, in this section. To formalise the above ideas, 
or doubts, we would have to drop the law of the excluded middle 
for formulae involving M and to alter A2 so that it only applied 
to subclasses of sets. However, theorem 5.13 shows that such a 
theory would be very weak as A" , a theory in which it would be 
contained, cannot even prove one version of the axiom of infinity.
Definition 5.12 A" is a theory set up in the predicate calculus 
using E  for membership and M(x ) for " x is a set ", Its axioms 
are Al, A3 and A4, where V is replaced by M in the obvious way, 
together with the following weakened form of A2.
A2~ M(x )-4  3 z V t  ( tE z 64t£ X ^  i  ).
Theorem 5.15 If ZF is consistent then A ' ^  (inf)^ , where Inf is 
the sentence 3x ( ^ 6  x ^ V y € x  yu{y} 6 x ),
Proof Let <B,E> be a model of Z 4-Vx 3«.xeRoc, in which the 
natural numbers are non-standard. We extend this to a model of 
A"" by taking B as the domain, E as membership and M(x) holding
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iff X has rank n in the model where n is in the isomorphic copy 
of the true natural numbers which is an initial segment of the 
ordinals in , A1 and A3 are clearly true in this model
and A2 holds as all subsets of the ( externally ) finite sets
will be in the model. To show that A4 holds suppose that
M(x)^M(y)^ V t  ( ^ (x,y,t) -tM(t) ). (^)
If there are only finitely many t's which satisfy )6(x,y,t) then
then there is obviously a set in the model which satisfies the 
conclusion of A4. Otherwise, the overspill lemma shows that there 
must be an infinite natural number in the model which is the rank 
of a t which satisfies ^  . This contradicts so that M  holds.
As all the sets for which M(x) holds are finite, it is clear 
that ( i n f i s  false in the model, as required. O
Next, we briefly consider alternative developments of ATI in 
which V and V  are not assumed to be " much larger than all of their 
elements ", Here, not all members of V could be used as parameters 
in (ATI), but theorem 5,15 shows that if none are allowed v/e again 
get a very weak theory. It still might be possible to find a 
natural way of distinguishing suitable sets, however.
Definition 5.14 ATI"" is the theory with axioms Al, A2, A3, V ^ V ‘ 
and ^ ( V ) ^ ^ ( V ’)» for all formulae j) with exactly one free 
variable,
Theorem 5.15 If ZF is consistent, then ATI"/inf.
Proof We produce a model of Al, A2, A3 and a finite number of 
instances of ^ (V) <^(V ) in which V is Bn, V' is Rm for some
n € m <è u> , and the domain is R W  , The result will then follow 
from the compactness theorem.
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Clearly Al, A2, A3 and V€ V» will hold in such a model.
Suppose that the given instances of the schema contain the formulae
Then at least one of {mG^A) \ Rui V> 
and { m ^  w  I Rojl= 4  o (^)] is infinite and let he one of them
which is infinite. Then at least one of (raeA^ jRo> ^ ^ /Rm)} 
and {^ m 6 A^ I Rto  ^1 ^ # (Rm) is infinite and let A, he one of them 
which is infinite. Continuing this process we get an infinite set 
A^^l with the property that
\/i<[nVm,m'^L Af^ .,( Ruo ^  Rij> ^^(Rm’) ), Choosing two
numbers from A^-i then gives us a model with the required property, Q
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Chapter 6 
Some isolated results
6.1 Permutation models of A
In this section we extend some of the work on permutation 
models of ZF ( see j[^ 143 » for instance ) to models of A. This 
suggests that it should be possible to extend much of the Frankel- 
Mostowski machinery to models of A but, at the moment, we do not 
think that this would give sufficiently interesting results to be 
worthwhile. The main result of this section is theorem 6.2 and we 
use it to answer a question raised in [56^ .
Definition 6.1 A functional formula, y - F(x), is said to be a 
permutation if it represents a bijection of the universe onto 
itself. If y ~ F(x) is a permutation then we write x €, y for
F(x)6" y and for the formula Î with all instances of ^  replaced
by Ey. .
Theorem 6.2 If y — F(x) is a functional G.-formula such that
(i) F is a permutation,
(ii) x ^ V  iff F(x)£V,
then we can interpret A in A using 6t|- for the membership relation 
and V as V.
Proof Firstly note that x V <~^F(x)€ Ve4x e_V, and we often use 
this in showing that the interpretations of the axioms hold.
(Al)p Extensionality holds as F is a bisection.
(A2)p We show that Vt (t €> z t€ V i-p ). By A2 and (ii)
3 z V p  (p<iz <-^3t tv (p  = F(t)^ Jf ) ). Then 
t Ep z<4F(t)G z V fp, as required.
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(A3)p Firstly we show that y £V~^xÊV,
X S p y F(x)G y ~^F(x) <c X € V, by A3 and (ii). Now it remains 
to show that V t  ( t E p x - ^ t  6 ^ y  ) ^yeV--^x£V.
X ~^t &p y ) -^ Vt ( F(t) € X F(t) e y ) by definition,
"~^xGy by (ii),
~>x € V by A3.
(A4)p Suppose that x,y£V and V t  ( (x,y,t) -4 t 6 V  ), and we
show that "3zE.vVt ( t £ p z(-4 ^ p(x,y,t) ). Let r^x,y,z) be the 
formula 3t ( p - F( t) ^  {kp(x,y,t) ) and then from (ii) we get 
V p ( 'Ÿ* (x,y,p) p 6V ). Then by A4 3 z £ V Vp ( pE z<-^ ^ x,y,p) ). 
Now t £pZt-^F(t)£z S^p(x,y,t) so that (A4) ^  holds, Q
Corollary 6.3 If y =  F(x) satisfies the conditions of the theorem 
then we can interpret Ai-ZF^ in A+'ZF*^ using for member­
ship and V for V.
Proof This follows directly from the theorem and the usual result 
for ZF® which is proved in [14] , for instance. O
Question 4.24(c) of [5^3 asks
" If we add the following schema of downward reflection to 
A, then do we get A’^  ?
DR If has exactly two free variables, then 
y E V ^ < ^ ( V , y ) 3 x e V ^ ( x , y ) ,  "
We shall answer this question negatively, provided that ZF 
is consistent, by interpreting A + DR in At  DR in such a way that 
the interpretation of A3 fails.
Let y ~ F(x) be a functional E -formula which says that
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F(72)= -Î.72} ,
F({72) ) = 72 ,
F(x ) =  X, otherwise,
F obviously satisfies the hypothesis of theorem. 6,2 so that result 
shows we can interpret A in A4rDR using €.p for membership. An 
instance of (DR)p becomes
^p(V,y) ->lxsv ^ f(x.y).
This is just another instance of DR so that we can interpret A't'DR 
in A4"DR using Ep for membership. The interpretation of A3 does 
not hold as x Ep F(x) 6 ^72} E>F(x) = 7 2 f 4 x  72} ,
as required.
6,2 Real classes
In a first order theory in which all the objects are sets 
questions about arbitary subcollections of sets do not really arise. 
However, when we add classes to the theory it becomes conceivable, 
from some points of view, that there are subclasses of sets which 
are not sets. This possibility has been considered for NBC in £70} 
and we indicate, in this section, how it is possible to set up an 
analogous system for A^ .
It is natural to consider real classes in such a system, where 
a real class is one which intersects all sets in a set. This is a 
problem for producing an Ackermann-type theory as the notion of a
real class is defined in terms of V and so cannot be used in A4.
Our formal theory gets round this by introducing a nevf predicate 
for real classes and a further predicate for hereditary real classes. 
The latter notion cannot be defined by recursion as we are not
guarenteed any structure above V.
The axioms of the theory are obvious modifications of those 
of A and the condition which replaces x^yeV*-^xEV is intended 
to say that subclasses of sets which are defined by reference to
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nicely behaved classes are themselves sets.
Definition 6,4 The theory R has the language of A extended by two
unary predicatess Rc(x) for " x is a real class " and HRc(x) for
" X is a hereditary real class ", Its axioms are
RO Rc(x) V y  6 V 3 z £ V  Vt (t£ z<->t€x ^ tCty)
HRc(x) 44 Rc(x)^ V y £ x  HRc(x),
R1 Vt (t£ x<^ tE y) X - y,
R2 If Î is  any form ula  not in v o lv in g  z, then 3z V t  ( t €  z < -^ t£  V ) f
R3 x6 yE V "-t X E V
If Î has exactly three free variables, then 
Rc(x) ^ Rc(y) ^ z £ V  ^  {t£ z \ 3:^(x,y,t)} £  V,
R4 If Î  is any formula with exactly three free variables which 
docs not involve V, then
x,yE V ;\Vt ( £ ( x , y , t ) t e v ) -> 3 z E v V t  (t£ z<c->î (x,y,t)),
R5 X tV,^'3y y<£ X 3 y €  x V z £ y  z^x.
Theorem 6,5 If J is an £ ,V-sentence, then R 4-VxRc(x)h Î iff  ^t. 
Proof This follows directly from considering the axioms. Q
Theorem 6.5 shows that R can be viewed as a refinement of 
as one would expect. It is straightforward to prove a number of 
of elementary results in R ( similar to theorem 1,6 in (^563 )
and, using these, we can prove the next theorem which shows that the 
hereditary real classes form an inner model for . The only 
surprising fact about this is that RO gives us sufficient information 
about HRc,
Theorem 6,6 Iff is an 6, V-sentence, then R |- iff I" #  .
Proof Omitted, due to length and lack of originality. Q
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6.5 Modified abstraction principles
On page 428 of 7/ang briefly considers Ackermann' s set
theory and he suggests that it might be possible to allow any
formula to occur in A4 if we modify the axiom to
A 4 w  x , y E V ^ V t  (i(x,y,t)-^ ttV) ^ 3t <= V-n J(x,y, t)
3 z 6 V V t  ( t G  z O  £ ( x , y , t ) ) ,
where all free variables are shown.
He also mentions tliat it might be necessary to add the existence of 
the empty set as an axiom, but it is straightforv^ard to check that
there is a model of such axioms in which V ■=* . However, our
next result shows that if v/e add an axiom asserting the existence
of two sets then the theory becomes inconsistent.
Theorem 6.7 The theory with axioms Al, A2, A3, A4^, and 
3 x 6 V 3 y E V x ^ y  is inconsistent.
Proof In this theory we firstly prove
V x G V  x^x. (^)
Suppose that 3 x 6 V  x £ x  and let ^ (x) be the formula x £ V ^ x 4 x .
Then by A4^v z - ^t | t & V  ^ t ^ t }  £ V, but z £z <^z^z, so that )
holds. From { ^ )  we know that
V $ V.
Let x£ V and we can suppose that , Using t ^  t in A4,
we see that <^: £V, Let î^(t) bet€V^t^(f> so that by A4 
z’ =. ^x I xc-V^x E V. Let &  ^  (t) be 16 z' ^  t ^  ^  .
Then V t  ( Î  ^ ( t ) t  EV), z'^z* by ()K) and z» by our
assumption that there are at least two sets. Hence we can use 
5^ in A4v^ and this gives {x | x^z'^xz: j> \ e V, i.e. V£V, 
which contradicts t^ )i Q
vv
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Wang’s idea was to allow V to appear in the formula of A4 and 
to alter this axiom to give an extension of A, If ^  is a formula 
with three variables which could be used then we would have
(i) V z  ( 5(x,y,z) - ^z&V  ).
The other conditions which w^ e put on %  must prevent it from being 
equivalent to zE V, as this implies VEV, In fact, noticing the 
downfall of A4w  » v/e must prevent the possibility of ^  being 
converted to a definition of V when the process of conversion does 
not mention V, More precisely, if ^ is a formula with exactly four 
free variables, then E would satisfy
(ii) -nVt (tE V ^ 3  z( î(x,y,z) ^^(x,y,z,t) ) ).
Our next result shows that if % satisfies the above conditions 
then *^ z I ^ (x,y,z)3r E V is already provable in A*' • Consequently, 
A'^  is maximal in this sense.
Theorem 6.8 If 5 is a formula with exactly three free variables, 
x,y6 V and Î satisfies (i) and (ii), then A^ Ir { z { §(x,y,z)j é V,
Proof Suppose that the hypothesis of the theorem holds and let ^ 
be the formula 3 cc, p ( cc =-the rank of z ^  0 6 R ^  ). Then
(i) and (ii) show that s -= -^ t ( 3z ( {  (x,y,z) ^  ^  (z,t)} C  V,
The ordinals in s form an initial segment of those in V, and let 
be their sup re mum. Then V z  ( ^ (x,y,z) —^zER'ÿ 4-1 ) so that the 
result follows by A2, O
There are some similarities between Wang’s idea and a modific­
ation of the general abstraction principle ( i.e. jlx'^y (yExE^K), 
for any Q  -formula K ) which Hintikka described in C26] , We 
shall show that Hintiklca's axiom together with certain other axioms 
is inconsistent. This indicates another direction in which A4 
cannot be generalised.
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Hiii'txîcka proposed two modified versions of the abstraction 
principle. The first of these is
3xVy ( y X y^xf> ), (l)
where ^ is any foraula which does not involve x and obtained
from by replacing subfomulae of the form 3 z V  by 3z (z fx/vS’") 
and those of the form V z ^  by Vz(z ^  x-^ etc., in such a 
way that all the variables become distinct. The second version is
3 x V y  ( y f  I ,\y # Z, . . . ^ yf. -4 ( yfcx O  ÿ+) ), (2)
where is a fornula of the type described above and Zj, . , z^ 
are all its free variables.
In [27] , Hintikka derived a contradiction from (l), but not 
from (2), and he argued that this was a disproof of Russell's 
vicious circle principle. Sliiman has suggested ( in ) that
this is not the case as the contradiction requires instances of (l) 
which contain free variables. Ee has produced a more complicated 
theory which ensures that the set being defined by an instance of
(1) cannot occur as a value of a bound variable in the specification 
of a parameter used in this instance.
Theorem 6.9 shows that (2) is inconsistent with some very 
reasonable set theoretic principles. We will also indicate how 
this result extends to a number of weaker theories. The reasonable 
principles are extensionality ( this is a basic assumption for set 
theory ), the nonexistence of two cycles of sets ( this seems 
essential in formalising the vicious circle principle ) and the 
existence of three sets.
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Theorem_6_._^  The axiom of extensionality and (2) are inconsistent 
with the following axioms
(i) VxVy€xx(^y,
(ii) lx,y,z ( X f  y ^ y  ^ x  ).
.% 9 P ,( We assume that extensionality, (2), (i) and (ii) all hold 
and we derive a contradiction. Obviously we have
(iii) Vx x^ X.
By (2) 3 x V y  ( y ^ x ~ > (  y£x<r^y = y ) ) and then by (iii)
3  X Vt ( t£ xE-ÿ t ■*’ t ;^t ^  X ). Then (i) shows there is a unique 
X satisfying this condition and we call it a. We next show that 
^ 3 x a£x. (^)
Suppose that 3 x  a £ x  and then a ^ x  by (iii), so that a € x E a  by 
the definition of a, which contradicts (i). Thus (^) holds.
By (2) 3 x V y  (y x -^(y6 x 4 ^ n  3z(z f  x ^ z =^y ,vyEz) ) ), 
and let b be an x satisfying this expression. If b a, then from 
(i<), a€ b £a, which contradicts (i). Hence b = a and we get 
V y £ a - » 3 z  ( z ^ a ^ y £ z  ). (^ ^  )
By (2) 3 x  Vy ( y ^  x ->( ye xEf y ^  y ) ) and we then get 
3lxVy ( yex<r>y -f y ) and we call this x ^ , as usual. From
(ii) 3z ( (fj z a) and z£ a follows from the definition of a. 
Also, 3 y  y£  z by extensionality, but this y yb a by (i) so that 
y £ a as well. This contradicts (4^  ^  ) * CD
The only instances of (2) which have been used in the proof of 
theorem 6.9 have no parameters so that this proof will go through 
for any version of (2), no matter what conditions are put on the 
free variables. In particular, it applies to Shiman’s system of
[ 6 5 ]  .
Just for completeness theorem 6.10 shows that assumption (ii) 
was necessary in the last theorem.
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Theorein _6,10 The theory with axioms extensionality, (2), (i) 
and 3 x,y x ^  y is consistent.
Proof Consider the model ^ \ } where the membership relation
is used for £ • Clearly we only need to show that (2) holds in 
this model and let be the formula used in an instance of (2),
If has two or more free variables then (2) will be vacuously
satisfied so we can suppose that "'j/- has only one free variable.
Firstly we consider the case when /  contains no quantifiers. Then
and it will always be true or always false so that letting 
X be or , respectively, shows that (2) is satisfied.
If 'Ÿ' contains at least one quantifier, on a variable z say, then 
after this quantifier we have z jr x ^ z y. Again, becomes 
always true or always false and (2) is satisfied as before, Q
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Chapter 7 
Some natural model problems
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter we consider some natural model problems which 
were motivated by earlier results in this thesis, A few results are 
given but really v/e do no more than to point out some possible 
directions for future research.
Sections 2, 5 and 4 are concerned with E ( 0 ) and U(p ), where, 
as in chapter 5, E(0) —  {cc \ and
U( P ) - I I R^<x. ,Rp ; 6 A] . It is clear that E( 0 ) forms a
tree under the ordering ' «  0' iff R-ic*-<R{3’, and we shall often 
refer to this tree structure on E( ^  ) without explicitly mentioning 
it. There are a large number of questions concerning the structure 
of E( 0 ) which seem interesting in their o\m right, but we shall 
only consider some basic structual properties.
In the last section we introduce a problem concerning the 
definability of ordinals in natural models v/hich is a generalisation 
of the natural models of A and A"^  .
7.2 Is E( B ) always bounded ?
Theorem 3.15 shows that U( 0 ) is not always bounded and it is 
natural to ask if this is also true of E(0), We shall consider the 
following three ways of expressing the idea that E(0 ) cannot be 
bounded s only the first two of them can be written as statements 
of ZF,
(i) F(0 ), considered as a virtual class, is unbounded,
(ii) the lengths of the branches of E(j^ ) are unbounded,
(iii) E(0 ) has a branch which is unbounded.
The existence of a P satisfying all of these statements is 
provable in MIC ( see [45] ). Clearly (iii) ^(ii) =^(i), and we
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next show that neither of these implications can he reversed, with 
respect to natural models of ZM,
(a) To show that (ii)^(iii).
Let Jc he an inaccessible cardinal such that R&  ^  ZIvl and let X  » 
be the least ordinal for which R A:’< R k  . Then R x* l^ ZM *h(ii), for 
some ^ but (iii) cannot hold for this p as otherwise
taking the union of the unbounded chain would contradict the 
definition of X '.
(b) To show that (i)^(ii).
We assume that R)f k ZM, and then let be the
least ordinal which satisfies
3 , ; R c <  R0 < A  ZI.'I. (+)
Then let ^r', be the corresponding «x:, From theorem 7*5» 
below, E(a<C ’ ) is unbounded in R so that (i) is true of at ’ in 
R i f ’ , Further, E( c<.’) cannot have a branch of length 3 in R ’ 
from the definition of {T ’, so that (ii) fails for oc* in R *,
Part (a) shows that the existence of a ^ satisfying (iii) 
is not always true in natural models of ZM. We next suggest that, 
from a Cantorian viewpoint, there will be no such 0., The motiv­
ation behind this will be explained in the next chapter. If, in 
reality, there is such a 0 , then taking the " union " of the 
unbounded branch of E(j^) v/ould give the Absolute. Hence there 
would be an. an ordinal such that first order truth in R^ is the 
same as first order truth in the Absolute: we consider this very 
unlikely. There is a large factor of analogy in this argument as 
the union of elementary chains argument is only proved for the 
case when the chain is a set, but we still think that it is 
suggestive.
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We conclude this section by showing that the existence of a ^ 
satisfying (ii) is provable in ZM.
Theorem 7 .1 ZM |- 3  ^  ' the lengths of the branches of E( 0 ) 
are unbounded ',
Proof We work in ZIv'I and suppose that for every 0 , the lengths of 
the branches of E( 0) are bounded. Then put
p(c5c)=r \J [ % 13 ^ - VJ*{_the lengths of the branches of E(0 )}\
and as there are arbitarily large inaccessible cardinals we know 
tliat there are arbitarily large P(oc)s. Hence there is a functional 
formula G which satisfies
g (o ) — 0,
G(^ bl) =- F(’ the least satisfying F(/t)>G('xr) '),
Gr{\ ) ^ W  G(/U,), for "X a limit ordinal.
We clearly have G(cx:) ^ F(cc) for all ordinals'^ • G is a 
normal function so that, in Zîî, it has an inaccessible fixed point.
Let 3 be such a fixed point. As is inaccessible 
R k 3 0 ' the lengths of the branches of E(p ) are unbounded 
Let 0 be an ordinal which satisfies this condition in R/j , and then 
F( 0 • Hence we have
G(?t) >G( fi) ^ F(0 ) '^  'Q - G('*|) as >i is a fixed point of G. This 
is a contradiction. Q
7.3 The structure of E(^ )
We work in ZM and our first three results concern possible
lengths of E(0 ).
Theorem 7.2 V  ,"îS 3  ^  ^  E( ^  ) = ,
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know that there are arbitarily large ^ s with E(0 ) ’^ o c  
and let 0 ' be the least ordinal which satisfies
Suppose that E( ^  ’ ) and let ^ be the <x:th member of E( 0')#
Then ’ the least 0 for which ^ and Xé. and there
is a set of ordinals %  , for which R 0 R^ , v/hich has order type 
^  ’ shows that 0'(bDf(R^ ,R0'). This is a contradiction
so that E( ^  cKT. Q
Theorem 7»3 d 0 > ' the length of E( ^  ), considered as
a tree, is equal to Qc',
Proof Similar to the proof of theorem 7.2 Q
Theorem 7.4 V"oc,^( 30>jfE(j6) has a branch of length Cx:
iff cC is a successor ordinal )
Proof If :)C is a successor ordinal then a proof similar to that of 
theorem 7.2 shows that there is.n with the desired property. If 
Ocis a limit ordinal then no E(0 ) can have a branch of length ^3 
the union of elementary chains result, O
The next two results give some indication of the width of the 
trees which occur as E(0)s, and theorem 7.7 shows that all trees 
of length 2 occur as E(0)s. The method of proof used for theorem 
7.6 can be extended to give a number of similar results.
Theorem 7.5 If R g <  . . XR'^t <  R X , then E(/i ) fv ^
Proof Suppose that Rjl ^  R<f ; \  R^ , and that E( ^  ) X ^  l-ri
Then in we know that sup [ ^ | R 0 <  R^} exists and is
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ocv. This contradicts Df(Rac *i0} ) ^  Df(RsC^ , ( ^  ), so
that the result holds. Q
Theorem J_,6 If Rf. <  . . .< Roc * <  R^c,+, <  R < x , . . occurs
in a branch of E( 0), then E( 0) has at least branches all
of which have a different member less than ^
Proof Suppose that the hypothesis of the theorem holds and we show
that there are at least • splittings ' of E( ^  ) at .
Suppose that there are only B <C such splittings and then for 
some ^  ^  + ( is the t,'th ordinal for which Rw: j; ^  R \
and -‘3 ^  Rcxii •< R^-<^r X ijj. R O C - T h u s  EDf (r o c ,-^ R^ssc^^ , ),
which is a contradiction. I |
Theorem 7.7 For every tree of length 2, there is a ^ such that 
E(^) has that tree structure.
Proof Given a tree of length 2 with many branches, theorem 7.2
shows that there is a \/ith E(^ K  . Theorem 7.5 shows that
this E( 0 ) is of length 2, as required, Q
We finish this section by indicating how one mi^it consider 
the possible structures of short E(0 )s .
Definition 7.8 Let be the least ordinal for which
"g 0 < R0 •< R'ïi, and let oC, and ,B» be the corresponding
oC and .
By the usual arguments of this section E(cx , ) has only one 
branch of length 3 end E(oc, ) ^  1" 1. Theorem 7.5 shows that
E(^l) so that E( 0C|) has precisely branches so that
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its structure is
This method of constructing ^ s for which E(fi ) has a certain 
shape can easily be extended to other short trees, but we leave open 
the next problem.
Question 7*9 Can those trees which occur as E(^ )s be characterised 
in any nice way ?
IdL E(g) and tj(g)
In chapter 5 indicated that we often have E( ^  ^  U( ),
but we do not know when equality holds. The two theorems of this 
section give conditions which imply equality.
Theorem 7.10 If the length of E(^ ) is 4- , then E( p ) ^  U(p ),
Proof Suppose that the length ofE(p) is w  and that
cc 6.U( p )-E( ^  ), Then, by theorem 3.3,
3  %  Ç Df (lîn-x ,R p) R'^ ). Choose such a K  and then
by our assumption on E( p ), ^ will be the nth element of a branch 
of E( P), for some nG Then consider the greatest p such that
there are n-1 ordinals satisfying R p ^  R
and ' the definition of ', This shows that ^ Df(R^ ,Rp ),
contradicting theorem 3«1« Q
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Definition 7,11 ^ is said to be low if R^4,Rp.
Tlieqrem_._7 ,12 If p is low, then E( p ) “ U( p ).
Proof Suppose that p is low and that GU( p )-E( f ), Then, by 
theorem 3.3, 3 ÎJéoc( ÿ £ Bf(Bx ,Rp ) p < ), smd let % he
such an ordinal. Then the least ^ for which Rp < R ^  and ' the 
definition of )( ' shows that ^ E Df(R%: ,Rp ), contradicting 
theorem 3.1, Q
Corollary 7,13 E( p ) C  e( p • ) ^  Tj( f ) Q  U( ^ • ),
Proof Let p be an ordinal less than the first inaccessible 
cardinal for which U( p ) is unbounded ( such an ordinal exists by 
theorem 3.15 ) and let p ’ be the least ordinal for which R ^ ' < R p  . 
Then E( ^  ) S  E( p, * ), but as ^ ' is low, the theorem shows that 
U( p') =»■ E( P')» which is bounded so that U ( p ) ^ U (  P'), Q
Theorem 7.12 admits some generalisation, but we leave open the 
next problem.
Question 7.14 % e n  does E(p) =  U(f^) ?
7.5 Definability of ordinals using parameters
Theorems 3.2 and 4.14 show that natural models of A and A"^  
are equivalent to the nondefinability of ordinals in natural models, 
using certain parameters. This suggests that more general results 
might be obtainable and we briefly consider the problem of when 
there is an ordinal p ^Df (RoÇ ,Rp U  x), for x^Rac and .
This is clearly a generalisation of the notions of natural models 
of A and A+" , A partial solution was given in theorem 3.7 which 
says
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If is an inaccessible cardinal, ^  ^  x and x is a set of 
cardinality such that xCRoc, then there are K  many p 
for which p ^  Df (Roc ,R^ u x),
Thus the remaining problem is to extend this theorem to sets 
X of larger cardinality. It is clear that the members of x must 
fall into " jg bands " ( shaded portions in the diagram below )
and that x cannot contain any complete p band, but we leave open 
the next problem.
Question 7.15 How lange, relative to RoC", can x be when 
a  (i < «. K ^ Df (R°c ,Ep U x) ?
In this question ’ large ' can firstly be interpreted as 
cardinality, but it might also be possible to interpret it as the 
inclusion relation when results concerning scales might even hold.
X / / / / / 77777//
V  //,/////
X/
7
^ y
Y
o
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Chapter 8 
Cantor'3 work
8.1 Introduction
Although it seems possible to trace the notion of a set back 
for an indefinite period, it is indisputable that Cantor’s work 
made the greatest step, by far, in the development of the idea.
This is one of the reasons why we think it important to consider 
his work here. The other is that its nature is often misrepresented 
in textbooks arid mythology today.
Basically we shall give an account of Cantor's work on the 
notion of a set and, from his publications, we can discern three 
stages in the development of his ideas. It is quite possible that 
Cantor’s views remained constant and that we are really only 
considering different sta,ges of presentation, but we shall always 
write as if his papers correspond to his ideas, Tlie main references 
which we shall use are , T9] , [lo] and T^O] and we shall
usually refer to Cantor’s ( or C's for the rest of this chapter ) 
papers just by the year in which they were first published.
As well as describing C's ideas v/e shall often comment on 
points at which ■"■'irious problems arise and sometimes we shall inves­
tigate them further. Mso, we shall try to show how, in the 
development of set theory', some people inve gone astray ( knowin^y, 
or otherwise ) from the original ideas. Frequently, we shall 
impose certain ways of thinlcing on the published work so that we 
cannot be sure that vre are faithfully presenting C’s work, but we 
leave others to argue over such problems.
Actually, C has v/ritten relatively little on the notion of 
a set ( or aggregate, as it was called at the end of the ninteenth 
centuarys v/e shall alv/ays update such terminology without further 
mention ) and most of his v/ork concerns infinite ordinals and
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cardinals. He did not view these in the current way, but firstly 
as newly postulated entities and later as abstractions from ordered 
sets. During this chapter the terms ordinal and cardinal have a 
variable status ( among the three meanings ) and we hope that the 
intended usage will be clear from the context,
A reasonable introduction to C’s earlier work and some 
indications of his motivation are given in [30] , This also 
describes his first work on powers of sets ( two sets were said to 
have the same power if there is a bisection between them so this 
corresponds to cardinality ) and we shall not discuss this. For 
a discussion of the prior opinions and uses of the notion of infinity 
in mathematics and philosophy C’s 1883 paper is very good.
8.2 Early work on ordinals
In the last part of £1883] C explains certain principles by 
which, he argues, v/e can form new infinite ordinals. His language 
is very suggestive of one’s creating new objects in time and we 
shall discuss this interpretation in section 9•4.
C’s considerations start with the sequence of natural numbers 
(l) 1, 2, 3» • • • f I • • •
In this sequence each element is obtained from the previous element 
by adding a unit to it, and this process is called the first principle 
of generation. C then argues that v/e can posit a new number, 
which is the least number greater than all of the elements of (l). 
Then, applying the first principle of generation repeatedly, we 
obtain the new sequence
(A: tl, LU +2, L0t*3j • • • • , , , , ,
On the basis of this, and other, examples C defined the second 
principle of generation as follows,
” If any definite succession of ordinals is given, for which
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there is no greatest, a nev/ number can be created on the basis of 
the second principle, v/hich is defined to be the least number 
greater than all of the elements of the sequence, '*
Using this principle C then introduced oJ.n and in the
obvious way and he proceeded to illustrate the dazzling array of 
small countable ordinals. C then defined the totality of all 
numbers of the same pov/er as (l) as the second number class, (ll)
( (l) was called the first number class ), From the existence of
(II) and the second principle C then obtained a least member of 
the third number class, and so on, . In making these definitions 
C has used the third principle v/hich takes the form of a restrict­
ing, or limiting, principle on the second one. This states that 
the numbers to be next formed using the second principle are all 
to be of the power of a smaller number. To be precise, the 1883 
paper does not actually state the third principle, but it is said 
that (ll) has the required property and hence it is said to satisfy 
the third principle. From the introductory part of £l883 ]
( see page 547 ) it seems that C might have wanted the third prin­
ciple to give the number classes rather than to restrict all uses 
of the second principle in this way.
Some theorems on ordinal arithmetic and a proof that the 
pov/er of (ll) is the next greater cardinal to that of (l) form the 
remaining teclmical results of [l883] • These proofs are always 
of a higher order nature ( i.e. they consider sets of ordinals etc, ) 
but we shall consider this point again with respect to the later 
work,
Y/e learn from [30] that in 1883 the above approach to 
ordinals had already been replaced by C ( probably for reasons 
v/hich v/e shall outline in the next section ) and the notion of 
an order type was introduced a.s an abstraction from an ordered
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set. Further details of C's work between 1883 and 1890 are given 
in and we only note that some of the work which was published
in 1895 ( which v/e call later v/ork ) had been completed ten years 
earlier,
8.3 Some comments on the early work
The main criticisms of C’s esirlier work on ordinals seem to 
concern certain uses of the second principle and v/e find it conven­
ient to split the uses of this principle into the following cases.
(2a) When we a,pply it to a countable, increasing sequence of 
ordinals which have already been introduced and for which we have 
a notation. Such sequences are called fundamental ones,
(2b) Yi/hen we are producing a least ordinal of the next higher 
cardinality,
(2a) leaves no doubts that v/e have a definite succession of 
ordinals, but this does not seem to be true of (2b). The third 
principle might have been intended just as an assertion that (2b) 
is dealing with a definite succession of ordinals, but this still 
gives no reason for believing it. It seems intuitely reasonable 
that hov/ever we describe any procedure v/hich only uses fundamental 
sequences of ordinals we shall never be able to generate the first 
uncountable ordinal. The work on ordinal notations in ZF ( see 
page 215 of [59I , for instance ) also suggests this, Tlius, if 
the second number class is to be thought of as a completed totality 
we seem to require a more detailed description of the process 
by which it is tc be generated. In particular, what is a definite,
uncountable process ?
It is hard to imagine an answer to this question v/hich does
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not use an uncountable set to index the process, and the only way 
to get such a set, at the moment, seems to be by using the power 
set axiom. We cannot assume that C ha.d such a scheme in mind as no 
indication of it is given and it would hardly have been obvious to 
his readers. An alternative solution to this question would be 
to allow (2b) without the power set axiom by adding the proviso 
that the class of all ordinals less than the new one is essentially 
incomplete. However, we do not think that such an approach is 
intuitively very plausible.
On the basis of the above arguments we suggest that C’s
justification of the existence of the second number class is not
completely convincing. It is equally possible to advance analogous 
criticisms of the notion of a set which was given in C’s 1882 paper, 
v/hich, in chapter 2, v/e suggested v/as the basic idea behind 
Ackermann’s set theory. In that paper the concept of pov/er v/as 
considered as an attribute of " well defined collections ”, where
” A collection of elements belonging to any well defined 
sphere of thought is said to be well defined when, in consequence 
of its definition and the logical principle of the excluded middle, 
it must be considered as intrinsically determined v/hether any 
object belonging to this sphere of thought belongs to the collection, 
or not, and, secondly, whether two objects belonging to the 
collection are equal or not, in spite of formal differences in the
manner in which they are given, ”
C went on to emphasise that ” intrinsically determined ” 
does not mean tliat we can actually find the answer. With this 
notion of a set it is hard not to jump to the conclusion that all 
sets are definable, in some sense, so that there cannot be a first 
uncountable ordinal, all of whose members are sets. It might be
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worthwhile to consider how far one could go in formalising a system 
of sets and objects where all sets are definable, and we mention 
this again in section 8,8, Tliis notion is also slightly evident 
in the following definition of a set v/hich C gives in a note to the 
1883 paper. It is also possible to see the later ideas developing 
here,
” By a set I understand, generally, any multiplicity which 
can be thought of as one, that is to say, any totality of definite 
elements which can be bound up into a whole by means of a law, ”
8,4 Cantor’s later work
By the later work v/e mean the papers of 1895 and 1897. Here, 
the main aims are to establish a rigourous basis for the ordinals 
and cardinals, and to start the development of their theories. 
Throughout these papers set theory is not treated in general although 
C says that he intended to formulate this theory later. The 1895 
paper starts with the oft quoted ” definition ” of a set,
'* By a set we are to understand any collection into a whole 
of definite and separate objects of our intuition or thought, ”
It seems highly unlikely that C intended this to be anything 
more than a heuristic guideline as he frequently explains why certain 
sets can be said to exist. Consequently, we shall not treat this 
statement as a definition. We take it to mean that any collection 
which can be consistently " visualised ”, in some sense, can be 
thought of as a set.
Next in [I895] C explained his basic ideas about cardinality 
and the relationships between cardinals. He also defined arithmetic 
operations on the cardinals, proved some results ahout ^  and
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indicated some results concerning increasing sequences of cardinals. 
The most important point, from our point of view, is that C no 
longer based these ideas on direct intuition, but says that for 
a rigourous foundation of these matters v/e must turn to the theory 
of order types, which he considered next,
C starts from the notion of a linearly ordered set. He consid­
ered this as a set with a separate ordering relation rather than 
the current view which includes the ordering as a set. Order types 
are considered as abstractions from these ordered sets where the 
abstraction is thought of as a set, all of whose elements are 
" unity ”, which has the same order precedence as the given set,
C then discussed similarity of order types and finite order types. 
Finally, in [l8^5] > addition and multiplication of order types 
are considered and the order types of the rationale and the reals 
are discussed. The results include the well knov/n characterisations 
of the latter two order types.
This work continues in the 1897 paper where C defines vrell 
ordered sets as linearly ordered ones for which
(i) there is a least element,
(ii) if a part, f, of the set has one or more elements of the 
set above it, then there is an element of the set which 
follows immediately after f.
It is clear that this is equivalent to the usual definition of a 
well ordering, C then proved the results on well orderings which 
now form a well knov/n part of courses on set theory. Ordinals are 
defined as the order types of well ordered sets and the law of 
trichotomy for ordinals is proved rigourously. Then, at the 
beginning of section 15 of ^18973 > there comes what, from our 
point of view, is the most important definition in the paper.
This is
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The second number class, Z( ) ,  is the set of all order 
types of well ordered sets of cardinality "
In effect, this is allowing us to gather into a whole all the 
different well orderings of w  and, as such, it is a new principle 
which has not been previously used in these two papers. It is 
quite clear when an ordering of is a well ordering and, although 
we cannot give a process which enumerates the well orderings of w, 
we are allowed to gather them all together at one sweep. Thus 
Z ( i s  defined in a single second order way ( we take all well 
orderings of «0 - these can obviously be obtained from all subsets 
of ), rather than by a vague belief that the building up processes 
for obtaining ordinals can be continued through all countable 
ordinals.
C then proceeded to analyse Z(^^) and he proved that its 
cardinality is the next greater one to He also proved his
normal form theorem and this illustrates C's approach to set theory; 
he studied the structure of Z(j^^) in some detail, rather than 
getting involved in vaguer macro problems,
8.3 The second order nature of the later work
We think that, at the moment, the second order nature of C’s 
work cannot be overemphasised. If we were to begin to formalise 
his work on ordinals, then the principles ahin to (2a) could 
easily be handled within a first order system, but this does not 
seem to be true when it comes to the existence of Z(J^^) and the 
power set axiom. We do not think that 0 would have assented to 
founding set theory on full second order logic, where the variables 
X, Y, , , . range over subcollections of the ’ universe of all sets ’, 
for reasons which v/e shall discuss in the next section. We suggest 
that a suitable form of second order logic ( we calr it a mild
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second order theory ) would be one where X, Y, , , , range over all 
those collections of sets which are equipotent to a set, and 
X, y, , • • range over sets, as usual. Then the power set axiom 
( the existence of Z(^^) can be derived from this ) would take the 
form
V x 3 y  ( N/t€y t G x ^ V x G k X  3tc:y t — X),
This essential viewpoint gets lost in first order axiomatisations 
of set theory, such as ZF,
It is also important to notice how, on the basis of the above 
ideas, v/e can justify the comprehension axiom of ZF without any 
reference to truth considerations, as follows. We consider a set 
y and, for convenience, a formula with exactly one free variable.
If x 6 y  , C would argue that by the logical principle of the 
excluded middle, we would have ^(x) or ^(x). Then, as the 
power set of y contains all subcollections of y, there must be one, 
z say, for which V x  (x ^ z ^ x ^ i y  ^^^(x) ), Hence the comprehension 
axiom holds. This reduces the truth of comprehension to a question 
of logic and although people can, and do, work in non classical 
logics, classical logic is presupposed in all of C’s work.
This justification of the comprehension axiom runs counter 
to what some people have recently suggested and we think that model 
theory is partly to blame for this shift of emphasis. Here, one 
frequently considers first order ZF ( a quaint theory, as it only 
ensures that certain definable subsets exist although it is not at 
all clear what the variables range over so that we do not know in 
what sense these subsets are definable anyway ) and then from Skolem’s 
work we know that there are countable models of ZF so that people 
get very worried about which subsets of w , for instance,
” really exist ”, They also begin to thinlc that comprehension 
is true because, for a given formula , they can check the truth 
definition of in the model, whereas questions of truth in set
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theory cannot use Tarski’s truth definition for it assumes that the 
universe is a single consistent totality,
A good example of bad motivation which follows from such 
misunderstandings is Barwise ’ s paper 53 • la the concluding 
remarks of that work he says that to allow all first order formulae 
to occur in the comprehension axiom ( a suggestion due to Skolem 
which is obviously inadequate for giving all subsets ) assumes that 
we can form a true universe of all sets, V/hy this should be true, 
unless Barwise is worried about truth definitions, remains a 
mystery, Banvise considers restricting the comprehension axiom to 
A q (^) formulae ( i.e. those formulae which are ^  ^  when we allow 
6^ , the power set operator, as a new basic symbol ) and he seems 
quite willing to believe these instances. But now if one is 
willing to believe the power set axiom in its mild second order form 
then all instances of comprehension follow, and if one believes it 
in some other form it seems to be a harder problem to say which 
subsets exist than to accept the comprehension axiom.
It seems that [7^3 is the origin of such heresies and the 
presupposition of this paper is that set theory is a first order 
theory rather than a mild second order one. This fallacious belief 
seems to be held largely by people who publish in logic journals: 
mathematicians, in general, seem quite happy to believe in a 
genuine power set operation which cannot be first order. In [_72j 
Zermelo talks of comprehension holding for " definite properties ” 
and this notion is an open ended extension of Skolem’s restriction 
to first order formulae. Mthough all instances of Zermelo’s 
comprehension axiom will be true from a Cantorian viewpoint, 
there does not seem to be any reason for supposing that these 
ideas suffice for describing the true power set operation.
Finally, in this section, we note that, in [73 > Borel 
criticised C's work on ordinal numbers and he was probably
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referring to the earlier work so that his reasons might have been 
similar to those of section 3* Borel acknowledged C's proof that 
was larger than but he did not believe in the existence of
iU|, This was the motivation for his later (famous ) work. In a 
footnote Borel asks why there should be a least cardinal greater 
than although from C's later work and the Schroder-Bernstein
theorem ( both of which had been published before [73 ) there seems 
to be a convincing proof of this fact. Of course, we do not know 
that Borel was aquainted with these results and, as he offered no 
criticisms of them, we assume that he v/as not. Thus his work was 
motivated by doubts about the principle (2b) and we shall later 
suggest that other work also arose in this way,
8.6 Inconsistent multiplicities
A letter which C wrote in 1899 ( see [l03 ) contains what 
we consider to be his final conclusions about the notions of set, 
ordinal and cardinal. The discussion in the letter assumes that 
there are multiplicities ( we hope that tliis word does not have any 
connotations of oneness ) which are not sets. The main point of 
the letter is to show that all cardinal numbers are alephs, or, in 
effect, that every set can bo well ordered. However, C firstly 
outlines his general ideas.
C says that it is necessary to distinguish between two sorts 
of multiplicities ( he always assumes that we are considering only 
definite multiplicities ) and he says that for some multiplicities 
the assumption that '' all of its elements are together '' leads to 
a contradiction, so that it cannot be conceived of as ” one finished 
thing ". On the other hand, if the elements of a multiplicity 
can be thought of as ” being together ”, then it is called a 
consistent multiplicity, or a set. Thus all notions of processes 
and building up are eliminated and the whole of set theory is
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given in one psychological ( though not obvious ) swoop.
Then C gives informal versions of the axioms of ZF as ways of 
getting from one set to another. Hence it would seem more reasonable 
for this theory to be called CZP than ZF. Two of the statements 
which are of interest to us are
(a) T\ro equivalent multiplicities are either both sets or both 
inconsistent,
(b) Every subinultiplicity of a set is a set,
(a) obviously implies the replacement axiom and (b) suggests that
our mild second order theory is a reasonable formalisation of part 
of C’s ideas. C probably believed these axioms because of consid­
erations of the Absolute, althou^ he does not explicitly say this.
As examples of inconsistent multiplicities C gives ” the totality 
of all things thinkable " andfL, v/hich is the system of all ordinals 
under their natural ordering. Tlie proofs that these multiplicities 
are inconsistent are, of course, the usual paradoxes, 0 then 
reiterates his work on ordinals and gives the following proof that 
if V is a definite multiplicity and no aleph corresponds to it as 
its cardinal number, then v must be inconsistent.
Suppose that v is a definite multiplicity and that no aleph 
corresponds to it as its cardinal number. Then ” we readily see 
that, on the assumption made, the whole system JH-is projectible 
into the multiplicity v, that is, there must exist a submultiplicity 
v ’ of V that is equipotent to the system-A.. v ’ is inconsistent 
because is and the same must therefore be asserted of v. ”
From this C proved the law of trichotomy for cardinals «
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The quoted proof was objected to by Zermelo as it used inconsistent 
multiplicities: we consider this further in section 8.
C's considerations of inconsistent multiplicities can be 
argued to follow logically from his earlier work as, in [18833 > 
he says that considering the infinite in the sense of finite 
increasing without bound implies the existence of the truely 
infinite as the domain for the variables. In this way, the use of 
variables over sets necessitates the existence of inconsistent 
multiplicities as their domains.
In the introduction to C's letter in [243 y van Heijenoort 
says that C's inconsistent multiplicities prefigure the distinction 
bet\7een sets and classes which was introduced by von Neumann,
This seems to be untrue as the nature of proper classes assumes 
that they are definite, fixed totalities which are not inconsistent 
by their very existence. The idea of a proper class seems far more 
likely to have originated with Zermelo's definite properties.
8.7 Cantor's notions and set theoretic developments
Before we consider some of the interelations between C’s 
notions and set theoretic developments, we shall return to the so 
called definition in [l895*3 9 which says
'' By a set we are to understand any collection into a whole 
of definite and seperate objects of our intuition or thought, "
It is often claimed that this leads to an inconsistent theory 
and, as an example of this,we quote from pages 285-6 of [5l3 •
We do not think that the sense is altered by the omissions,
'' Cantor's definition has not been retained in quite its 
orifTinal form by later authors, but was replaced at an early stage
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by 8- more abstractly conceived principle, or axiom, that has become 
knovm as the principle of comprehension We refer to it as the 
abstraction principle so as not to confuse it with the axiom of 
comprehension 3 • • • • |^This3 can be expressed in the following 
form
3zVx ( xéz^fi(x) )
• • • • The formal system which we have obtained in this v/ay 
12 the abstraction principle and extensionality formulated in the 
first order predicate calculus with €*3 • • • • may indeed be regarded 
as a reasonable formalisation of Cantor's naive theory of sets, "
This argument simply does not seem to be valid. Presumably 
the variables of the formal system are ranging over sets, but then 
the abstraction principle shows certain objects to be sets whilst 
C showed that they v/ere not sets. The formal system has more in 
sympathy with Frege than with C as it ignores C's insistence on 
our being able to visualise all the members of a set being together.
Also, on page 262 of [2o3 , Godel suggests that ” a satisfactory 
foundation of Cantor's theory in its whole original extent and 
meaning '' can be given on the basis of iterations of the notion 
of " set of ”, and this contrasts sharply with the suggestion that 
a reasonable formalisation of C's theory is inconsistent.
Next we point out three areas where people have extended set 
theory using now principles which run centry to C's ideas. Their 
justifications do not seem to be as well motivated as C's work.
The first example is Ackermann's set theory which we discussed 
in chapter 2. The second is the notion of building up sets 
'' in time ''; [^lli and [52 j being examples of this. On page 
573 of [1883] C says that, in his opinion, it is v/rong to use the 
concept of time to explain the much more basic concept of a
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continuum and hence it is reasonable to suggest that this is also 
true for the notion of a set. Thirdly, there is the topic of 
reflection principles and their connections with the Absolute,
[503 Î for instance, axioms are asserted which suggest 
that there exist sets ( or at least consistent multiplicities for 
the notion of set in such theories is often weaker than C's notion ) 
which resemble ( e.g. are elementary substructures of ) the Absolute, 
It is quite clear that C believed we could not have any good 
approximation to the Absolute and on page 58? of [I883] he says
" There is no doubt in my mind that in this way producing 
new number classes 3 we may mount even hi^er, never arriving at 
any approximate comprehension of the Absolute. The Absolute can 
only be recognised, never known, not even approximately, ''
Thus if we are to have any strong reflection principles and 
to maintain a Cantorian viewpoint then we must believe that the 
expressive power of the language under consideration is hopelesly 
inadequate for truth in the Absolute, However, such ideas do not 
seem to be considered at all in tlie works on reflection principles. 
One way of mailing reflection principles and Ackermann's set theory 
more reasonable is to consider them as v;ays of picking out certain 
ordinals which occur in their natural models, but this was not 
the original motivation for these ideas.
Comparing the kind of results which C proved with those 
which are proved today we get another contrast, this time in 
methodology. He concentrated on struotual problems for small sets 
rather than larger cardinals, for instance. Although C was 
investigating problems which occur in nature ( specifically the 
continuum hypothesis, of course ) perhaps we could still gain
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much guidance from small, struotual considerations.
Sierpinski is one of the very few mathematicians who have 
continued to work in C’s original spirit. Some further topics 
for 8truetual consideratiohs are countable order types ( although 
there is quite a bit in the literature on this topic ) and other 
countable partial orderings. Another topic which seems to have
been neglected is n dimensional order types ( for n f W  see page
80 of [9l ) end higher dimensional ones. It might be possible
to show that cill interesting questions concerning these objects can
be reduced, in some uniform way, to questions about ordinary order 
types, but we know of no such results.
8.8 Formalising parts of Cantor’s work
Here, we shall briefly outline three problems connected with 
formalising parts of C’s work. Firstly, there is the ” constructive ” 
notion of building up sets 'by a definite process, v/hich we shall 
again refer to in the next chapter. These ideas have been considered 
by Lorenzen, [41^ » Wang, [71^ > Borel, [ 73 » end many others.
We consider all this work to be motivated by C’s ideas which lead 
to the first principle and the principle (2a). Is it possible to 
isolate a definite part of set theory which results from just these 
principles ( when (2a) is modified to deal with sets as well as 
ordinals ) ?
Our next considerations concern the interpretation of C’s 
earlier work, mentioned in section 3» which suggests that all sets 
are definable. Although we cannot easily formalise such statements 
in a first order system v/e indicate how a first order system, 
analogous to ZF, could be set up , the axioms of which would be 
true under this interpretation. It would not be assuned that all 
members of sets are sets so that an additional predicate, i.l(x),
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would be introduced for " x is a ( definable ) set ", We then let 
Jj(x) stand for 3 ly ^;(y) éj^ (x), where <f> (x) is an ^ -formula
with one free variable, and we would have the schema
5 (x) M(x).
The other axioms would be obvious variants of those of ZP and, for 
instance, the comprehension axiom would talce the form
( K(z),^Vt ( t e z«r»texA<^(t,y) ) ).
This system v/ould be quite similar to one which Friedman 
introduced in [l7*]| and if v/e add V x  M(x ) ( which is false under 
our intended interpretation ) to our system it becomes Friedman’s, 
Obvious questions which one could ask for this system are its 
relative consistency and the structure of its models, but we shall 
not pursue these questions.
Our final considerations in this chapter concern C ’s notions 
of inconsistent multiplicities and the Absolute, We hope to consider, 
elsewhere, the general problems of formalising these notions and 
here wo only consider the conversion of C’s proof that every set 
has a cardinality which is an aleph ( see section 6 ) into a proof 
which would be acceptable in a ZF like system.
We assume that all variables range over sets and then the 
hypothesis of the proof is
- ^ 3  oC V ^  )L: ( ^ )
C then considered it obvious that we could project the whole of 
JL  into V, If we interpret this as meaning that there is an 
injection from JTL into v, then this leads to a contradiction in 
ZF, Hence the question reduces to showing that TL can be projected 
into V,
C seems to have used the axiom of choice as a logical principle 
so that we feel it is reasonable to assume the existence of a 
choice function Fs i S * ( v ) - v  with F(x) (z x. Now the
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argument that X L  can he projected into v can he represented by 
defining the following function by recursion
g(0) - F(v) 
g( ^16)-F(v-gC>^ ] ), 
and then we know that g must be defined on all ordinals as, other­
wise, consideration of the least ordinal for which g is not defined 
contradicts (^ (<),
Thus it is possible to get a proof of the well ordering theorem 
from C's proof ( by eliminating one of the reductio ad absudrums ) 
so that there are grounds for believing his proof. However, it 
remains true that Zermelo was the first person to rigourously prove 
the well ordering theorem without using inconsistent multiplicities.
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Chapter 9
ZP and quasi-constructive approaches to set theory
9.1 Historical developments of ZF and NBC
Briefly, Zermelo first axiomatised part of Cantor's work 
( see [723 ) and then Frankel noted the omission of the replacement 
axiom ( see [l53 )• However, Zermelo's axiomatisation included 
the notion of a " definite property ", or definite assertion, so 
that his comprehension axiom took the form
For every definite prepositional function F(x),
V y B z V t  ( t e z < - ) F ( t )  ^ t € y  ) .
It is not completely clear v/hat Zermelo meant by a definite property, 
but Skolem suggested that it could be taken as any first order 
expression ( see [ 69] ), giving us the theory which is now known
as ZF, We believe that Skolem's suggestion is, essentially, a 
correct interpretation of Zermelo's ideas, except that Zermelo 
wanted to allow all ( definite ) predicates to appear in the 
comprehension axiom rather than just E , so that his notion is open 
ended.
Another line of development from Zermelo's axioms is that 
which considers definite properties as objects in themselves,
Tîiis started with von Neumann ( see [46 3 ) and his justification 
of this step seems to be somev/hat formalistic as he talks of how 
far the abstraction principle can be extended without generating 
the paradoxes. We shall ignore the fact that von Neumann's work 
is couched in terms of functions, but just note that the theory 
was put nearer modem NBC by Be mays in [43 » Nis theory explicitly 
considers two types of individuals, sets and classes, adopting an 
extensional view of both. For the rest of this chapter we shall 
use the term class for proper classes ( i.e. those classes for 
which there is no set which has the same members ), The obvious
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question which we must now consider is what these classes are 
supposed to be.
Prom the Cantorian viewpoint it would seem natural to think 
of classes as inconsistent multiplicities, but this is alien to 
their appearing as definite collections in a formal system. The 
next alternatives is to think of classes as genuine properties 
( rather than collections of sets ) or as the extensions of properties, 
possibly over some given collection. One criticism of both these 
approaches is that the notion of a property seems to be at least 
as complex as that of a set so that it is just as much in need of 
clarification; one need only consider the property of " not holding 
of itself ”, Also, if we think of classes as genuine properties, 
then NBG does not seem to be reasonable for
(i) Y/hy should properties be extensional ?
(ii) presumably there is a property U with x€.TJ corresponding 
to ” X is identical with x ", so that UfcU would have to 
hold.
There have been attempts to modify NBG to meet the second of these 
criticisms and we shall consider these in chapter 10.
The second of the alternative programmes was to consider classes 
as the extensions of properties, possibly over some given collection. 
Without the added condition, this view is still open to an obvious 
modification of (ii). Further, it is not at all obvious that the 
amended scheme could be carried out as the following situation 
might well arise. Suppose that v/e are taking classes as the 
extensions of properties over V, where, as in Ackermann's set theory,
V is thouglit of as the collection of all sets. Then there should 
be a property P meaning " is a set " and a property Q meaning 
" is identical to itself ' so that although these properties have 
the same extensions on V \/e would obviously want 3 x  ( xéQ^"^xfeP ) 
to be true.
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Thus none of the above explanations of the intended meaning 
of classes seem to be convincing. This leads us to consider two 
weaker alternatives. Firstly, classes could be thought of as virtual 
objects, in the sense of Quine in > so that they are identified
with first order definable predicates. On this view they become a 
convenient aid and , although they add nothing to our understanding 
of the nature of sets, they might make proofs easier to follow. 
Finally, one could adopt a formalist position and maintain that one 
is only interested in the usual models of first order ZF. Then 
classes are thought of as ( certain ) subcollections of the domain 
of the relevant model. This view, possibly that which is held by 
a number of people v/ho work with NBC-, has the disadvantage that 
it becomes meaningless when applied to the intended Cantorian 
interpretation of sets. It could still be useful though, if one 
thinks of formal set theories as picking out certain sets via their 
natural models etc,
9.2 ohoenfield’s principle
When introducing ZF in set theory courses now it is very 
popular to use the idea of building up a cumulative type structure 
as the heuristic guide. A typical treatment of this is given in 
[66*3 > where we find
" We then form sets in successive stages. At each stage v/e 
have already the urelements and the sets formed at earlier stages 5 
and we form into sets all collections of these objects. A collection 
is said to be a set only if it is formed at some stage in this 
construction , . , . Since we wish to allow a set to be as arbitary 
a collection as possible, we agree that there shall be such a 
stage ^i.e. one following a given collection of stages 2[ whenever 
possible, i.e. whenever we can visualise a situation in which all
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the stages of the collection are completed, , • , If a collection 
consists of an infinite sequence S,, , , . of stages, then v/e
can visualise a situation in which all of these stages are completed, 
so there is to be a stage after all of the , , , « Suppose 
that we have a set A and that we have assigned a stage to each 
element a of A, Since we can visualise the collection A as a 
single object ( viz, the set A ), we can also visualise a situation 
in which all of these stages are completed. This result is called 
the principle of cofinality, "
There are certain problems connected with a literal interpre­
tation of these ideas, such as v/hat indexes the stages and v/hat 
" assigned ” means, but these do not affect what is the intended 
meaning, Shoenficld goes on to justify all the axioms of ZF using
this principle. We consider this principle, which is sometimes
bo be
known as Shoenfield's principle, ^ a variant of Cantor's second 
principle ( from the 1883 paper ) combined with the power set 
axiom. Later, we shall show that it follows from considerations 
of the Absolute so that, in an imprecise sense, it is half way 
between ZF and the Absolute.
A significant problem for Shoenfield's principle is that it is. 
phrased in terms of the notions of building up stages and visualising 
situations so that the usual first order semantics do not give an 
intended model, Tims it only justifies ZF if we can jump to the 
conclusion that the process of visualising and completing has 
itself been completed as otherwise it is not obvious that the law 
of the excluded middle would hold. This is suggested by Kripke's 
constructive semantics ( see [35 3 ) where the lav/ of the excluded 
middle can fail although, as Kreisel mentions in [ 35] » this 
only holds for models which are themselves sets,. Also, this 
slightly dubious point ( if the building up and visualising is
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completed, then why can we not start again ? ) makes the set concept 
seem more complex than is necessary ( see the next section )• This 
makes some people worzy about such building up processes.
The problem of formalising Shoenfield’s principle is considered 
in [57] . Reinhardt slightly modifies it to
(s) ” If P is O' property of stages and if we can imagine a situation
in which all the stages having P have been built up, then there 
exists a stage s beyond all of the stages which have P. "
He introduces a new constant V such that x &V is to be thought of as 
" X is a set ", and then he produces a set theory which has 
some similarities with Ackermann’s system, has variables for
properties and an axiom corresponding to (S). Reinhardt shows that 
is very much stronger than ZF and, although this is very inter­
esting, there are still problems about what V and the properties 
are intended to he. It is suggested in [573 that the usual semantics 
are not really adequate for these ideas and it is a significant 
open problem to introduce a suitable semantics. Perhaps this is 
where one should start in formalising classes. In the philosophical 
remarks at the end of [57} » Reinliardt states that
" I have tried to introduce the axioms for properties in such 
a way that the naive reader v/ill find them natural for naive ( or 
Cantor's ) set theory ",
but, again at the risk of overemphasing a point, we do not think 
that it is reasonable to introduce properties as consistent 
collections whilst maintaining a Cantorian viev/point.
Finally, we note that Shoenfield’s principle could be argued to 
give answers to some questions v/hich are independent of Zi, For
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instance, it seems much easier to visualise a situation in which 
there is a scale for W  than one where the is no such scale. Are
we then justified in asserting the existence of such a scale ?
9.5 ZF from the Absolute
In this section we hope to shov/ that ZF can be justified by 
considerations of the Absolute. The viewpoint which we adopt is 
an extrapolation from that of [icQ , but we do not claim that this
is an exposition of Cantor's views,
¥e are thinking in terms of collections of objects where a 
collection is thou^t of as a ' bringing together ' of the objects 
under consideration. However, we must fir^y ask what the Absolute 
is. Basically, we think of it in terms of everything which has 
ultimate existences we shall not consider its metaphysical overtones,
With Cantor, v/e believe that the Absolute can be recognised ( which
implies that it is a meaningful notion, of course ) but that it can 
never be known. The latter point means that it is not good enough
to imagine some very large set playing the pert of the Absolute
because the inherent nature of the Absolute ensures that it cannot 
be thought of as a unity in itself. Our usage of consistent and 
inconsistent multiplicities will be as in the last chapter and we 
identify sets and consistent multiplicities. It does not seem to 
be immediately true that all inconsistent multiplicities have the 
same " size " as the Absolute, but we shall often assume that they 
share much of the nature of the Absolute, If we add a new principle 
saying that all inconsistent multiplicities are of the same " size "
( this would be analogous to von Neumann's maximal principle ), then
many of our arguments would flow more smoothly. We shall not do 
this as we do not find such a principle completely convincing, 
Extensionality is basic for the view of sets which we have
adopted and v/e next indicate how a version of Shoenfield's principle
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can be justified. The axiom of infinity follows from this by 
considering the natural numbers. Consider the version of (S) with 
' property ' replaced by ' collection ’, and then if we imagine a 
situation in which all the stages in P have been completed, v/e can 
imagine the collection of those stages as a consistent totality.
The nature of this collection is not that of the Absolute ( or any 
other inconsistent multiplicity ) so that we have a consistent 
multiplicity and there is a stage beyond all those in the collection 
P, We shall not use Shoenfield's principle to justify the remaining 
axioms of ZF as v/e believe it overcomplicates matters, but we 
indicate how they can be got directly from considerations of the 
Absolute.
The replacement axiom follows from Cantor's statement that 
" tv/o equipotent multiplicities are both consistent or both inconsis­
tent " . This is the same as saying that there cannot be two • 
equipotent collections, one of which is an inconsistent multiplicity 
and the other of which is a set: this seems a transparent fact 
from the nature of the Absolute. The comprehension axiom, in the 
form that every subcollection of a set is a set, similarly follows 
from the nature of inconsistent multiplicities.
The sum and pov/er set axiomr follow as it is inconceivable 
that an inconsistent multiplicity could be obtained from a set by 
one of these visualisable operations. This even clearer if v/e 
assume that all inconsistent multiplicities are the same size, for 
then the power set axiom, for instance, says that there is no set 
for which the collection of all its subcollections is the same size
as the Absolute,
Tlie axiom of foundation does not seem to be evident on this 
interpretation, although there is no reason why one should not 
restrict one's attention to well founded sets if it is desired.
Of course, the non existence of cycles of sets follows from our
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basic viewpoint of forming collections by bringing together certain 
objects. We consider the axiom of choice to be a logical principle 
for sets so that it is not in need of justification.
Now we consider two other kinds of axioms from this point of
view,
(i) Let-ui.be the inconsistent multiplicity consisting of all 
ordinals, ordered by their natural ordering. We consider certain 
axioms about " stopping points " in fb, It is convenient to think 
in terms of processes for going up «fb and then the nature of the 
Absolute shows that there cannot be any definite process, the comple­
tion of which is H ,  Thus if <j> (oc, ^  ) there must be a,
cardinal K  such that from below -x this process ( i.e. going from
CSC to the least ^  satisfying A  (x , p ) ) does not get beyond X  .
Further, it is reasonable to insist that Sc is regular as othervvise 
the process can be continued by taking the union of a shorter 
cofinal sequence. Consequently, we have the schema
Voc Reg(K ) rt p e K ^  (<=C, p ) ) ,
which, together with ZF, gives the theory ZM ( we showed that in
[37] )
(ii) The existence of a measurable cardinal does not seem to 
be justified, at the moment, by cuguments similar to those which we 
have already encountered,
(i) shows that 7 M can be justified from the Absolute and (ii) 
suggests that one should investigate other ways of justifying 
axioms from the Absolute, Y he the r or not measurable cardinals 
turn out to be reasonable, the latter programme should be very 
useful, For instance, does it give any new struotual information ?
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9 «4. Intuitionistic ZF
Intuitionistic ZF is ZF set theoiy based on intuitionistic 
logic. Myhill, in a seminar, suggested that such a theory, without 
the axiom of choice, corresponds to that part of ZF which gives 
effective results, using this word in the sense of [68] . This 
is a thoroughly reasonable attitude and, like Church's thesis in 
recursion theory, the conjecture is open to empirical testing.
However, intuitionistic ZF is also the end product of a paper 
of Pozsgay's, [52] , and for the remainder of this section we 
shall be considering this paper, Pozsgay claims to be formalising 
a certain intuitive approach to set theory which he thinks represents 
the basic insights underlying the ZF axioms. He thinks of sets as 
mental constructions and he gives the following principle for set 
construction,
" Any well defined mental process for constructing sets which 
has been clearly envisioned without ambiguities or contradictions 
may be regarded as already completed, regardless of any merely 
practical difficulties which may prevent one from actually carrying 
it out, "
On the basis of this principle Pozsgay argues that we can 
justify the axioms of ZF and, in particular, the power set axiom.
But what mental process is available for constructing the power 
set of W ?  Certainly we cannot give any skep by step procedure 
for doing this as any countable number of countable processes will 
remain countable. Somehow v/e need to j'^ unp to the uncountable set. 
Consequently, we feel that this principle does not justify the 
power set axiom, but that it must be added as a furtner principle. 
Then we seem to get Shoenfield's principle, though,
Pozsgay's paper splits into two sections and in the second he
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turns to the problem of formalising his principle, where he says
" As far as set theoretic axioms go, the best available seem 
to be the ZF axioms, and the main question is whether the underlying 
logic should be intuitionistic or classical, "
The procedure now seems to have very little to do with the 
original principle. For example, a first order theory is assumed 
without any explanation of how this affects the power set operation, 
although, in justifying the comprehension axiom Pozsgay circumvented 
the problem of impredicativity by saying that he took all possible 
subcollections of a set in the power set. Consequently we feel 
that the reasons for using ZF to formalise this work are a little 
obscure, but the reason for using intuitionistic logic seems even 
less clear,
Pozsgay states that he wants 3 x B(x ) only to be provable if 
there is " at hand a definite construction for producing a set x 
with the property B(x) ", Two pages previously he justified the 
axiom of choice and it remains a complete mystery how we are to 
give a definite construction for a choice function on infinitely 
many pairs of socks.
Basically, [52] belongs to those approaches to set theory 
which can be thought of as " building up in time " and hence we 
do not see how can be thought to exist ( unless one adds the
power set as an additional basic operation ), Hence Powell's 
approach to such a theory'’ in [5ll seems more reasonable, if 
one is not going to allow time to be completed.
In [57] we gave a possible axiomatisation of Pozsgay's 
building up ideas, but we now think that Wang's system of predic­
ative set theory ( ^  , see [7l] ) is probably a better candidate
for such a theory. To really axiomatise we should malve
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explicit the principles by which one indexes the types: perhaps we 
could just allow completions of fundamental sequences for some 
given system of notations. Section 4 of [37] contains some 
considerations of the power set axiom and we now believe that the 
ideas of that section are superseded by that of a mild second order 
logic, which we introduced in the last chapter.
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Chapter 10 
Set theories with a universal set
10.1 Introduction
In this chapter we shall consider some aspects of set theories 
in which there is a universal set ( i.e. a set x such that for all 
sets y y€. x ), Such a set cannot exist from a Cantorian viewpoint 
so there must he some other motivation for such theories. One 
possible approach is via properties and such theories are discussed 
in sections 5 and 6, The remaining theories all seem to result 
from formalist inspiration and the main one of these theories is 
ÏIFî sections 2-4 are devoted to questions related to this theory.
Another approach to set theories with a universal set has been
made by Church in [ll] , Here the motivation is that the abstrac­
tion principle is desirable but ( unfortunately ? ) it turns out
to be inconsistent so that we must investigate all ( formalistic ) 
v/ays of approximating to it whilst remaining within the realms of 
consistency or, at least, relative consistency. This view also 
seems to be an assumption for the book by Frankel, Bar-Hillel and 
Levy ( [iCj ), We have little sympathy with such ideas as there 
does not seem to be any clear reason why we should have believed 
the abstraction principle in the first place,
10.2 Quine's NF
Tlie theory W  was introduced in [53] and is formulated with 
6 as the only predicate. Equality is introduced by definition 
and there is an axiom of extensionality. The only other axiom is 
the abstraction principle for those formulae ^  which are stratified 
( i,e, one can attach numerals to the variables in such a way 
that v/henever x G y occurs in ^  with n attached to x, then n4"l 
is attached to y )• The motivation behind this is that stratified
_ 99 _
formulae correspond, in an obvious way, to those of type theory 
and that the paradoxes ( at least, the old familiar favourites ) 
do not seem to be derivable in the theory. Thus W  is a formalist's 
theory, but it still could be a reasonable set theory as well.
In [16] it is suggested that the unprovability of all instances 
of induction in Id?, if this theory is consistent, shows that it is 
not a reasonable theory,but it would be nicer to have a stronger 
condemnation, Tlie next section contains some arguments which show 
that NF is not, as it stands, a good set theory, in the sense that 
it is not adequate to describe certain mathematical notions.
Section 2 of Rosser and Wang's paper [62] claims to show that 
if NF is consistent ( we always assume this when discussing its 
models ) then it does not have a standard model. Briefly, the 
argument is as follows, IlF is assumed to have a model in which 
the natural nuiübers are standard and then, using Rosser's paper 
(603 , one shows that transfinite induction cannot hold for all the 
formulae of Id?, Consequently, the order relation of the ordinals 
in the model is not really well founded and NF cannot have a standard 
model.
The actual arguments which are used in the proof are correct 
but it is implicit throughout that the definition of ordinal which 
is used ( equivalence classes of ' well ordered classes ', in the 
sense of NF - ordinal(id?), say ) corresponds to the intuitive 
notion of ordinal ( ordinal(l), say ), There is no attempt in
[62] to show that ordinal(NF) is a good approximation to ordinal(l).
Usually, the definition of an ordinal occurs v/ithin an enviroment 
where we may suppose that all instances of the comprehension 
axiom hold and when this is not the case the definition of an
ordinal is suitably modified ( see, for instance, [l?] or [40]  )•
Prom page 474 of [6Ï] we Imow that KF does not ensure that the
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order type of the class of ordinals(KF) less than an ordinal(lIF) ûC 
is oc , so that it is natural to strengthen the definition ordinal(MP) 
to
ordinal*(NF)(x) zz ordinal(ÎIF)(x) ^* the order type of the
ordinals (IIP) less than x is x '. 
however, we still would not know that ordinal* (W) is a good approx­
imation to ordinal(l) in KF, Indeed, there might he no formula of 
I'lF which satisfies this requirement.
On this basis we suggest that Rosser and Wang's result shows 
that if has a standard model, then ordinal(KP) does not represent 
the notion ordinal(l) in KP, This suggests that one should look 
at the adequacy of the representations of the usual mathematical 
notions in IIP, rather than assuming that a formal definition gets
its intended meaning? we start this in the next section.
10.3 Ordered pairs in IIP
In any set theory, two sets are said to have the same cardinality 
if there is a bijection between them. Thus the notion of having 
the same cardinality ( which we call being equipollent ) is 
dependent on that of function and hence on that of ordered pair.
Me shall show that in KP, the definition of ordered pair v/hich is 
used affects whether, or not, two sets are equipollent, and we make 
some further considerations based on this fact. The following 
definitions will aid our discussions we hope that it is obvious 
how they could be made precise.
Definition 10.1 A formula 'ÿ'(x,y,z), with exactly three free
variables, is said to represent an ordered pair relation in a set
theory T if
(i) T hVx,y3iz ^(x,y,z), and
(ii) T HVx,x',y,y',z ( -)x = x'^y *y' ).
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Definition 10.2 If represents an ordered pair relation in a set 
theory T, then x is a formula which, in a natural way, says
that there is a function, represented as a set of ordered pairs 
which are defined using , which is a bijection from x to y,
M e shall alv/ays assume that z z: (x,y^ is a formula which 
says that z is the Kuratowski ordered pair ( i.e. ^ "{x^  , {,x,y^3 )
and this represents an ordered pair relation in both ZP and DP,
Also, X y means x%.^y , vfhere ^  is the formula z %  ^x,y^ .
The next theorem shows that, in a certain sense, the notion of
being equipollent is independent of the representation of ordered 
pairs in ZF set theory.
Theorem 10.3 If represents an ordered pair relation in ZP, then
ZP Vu,v { vf-^u% y  V ),
The proof of this result is completely straightfomvard. For 
instance, if u c^v then let f be a bijection from u to v, put
f* “=• { z  ( 3x,y ( ‘V(x,y,z) ^  ^x,y^ 6  f| and verify that uft^-^v
using f’,
From a mathematical point of view theorem 10.3 is highly desirable 
as the actual structure of the ordered pair does not seem to be 
important for two sets being equipollent. However, provided that 
IIP is consistent, the analogous form of theorem 10.3 for HP is false, 
even if v/e restrict to being a stratified formula. This can be 
seen as follows. If *(x,y,z) is the formula 
z rr , '[x, {y}}'}’ ,then represents an ordered pair
relation in IIP, By considering Cantor's theorem for IIP in [54]
Quine showed that if V - {x | x -= x] and S -  {^ x | 3 y  x —  { 3^ }  , 
then V ), but it is straightforward to show that 
in IIP, as required.
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The key point in this counterexample is that we have represented 
an ordered pair relation using a formula which can only he shovm 
to he stratified by attaching different numerals to x and y. It 
might be argued that this is not desirable in HP, but then one must 
explain the process of stratification in such a way that this 
becomes highly unreasonable as, from a mathematical point of view, 
there is no significance in the representation of ordered pairs.
The following weak form of theorem 10.5 does hold for HP.
Theorem 10.4 If ^^(x,y,z) and \^'(x',y',z') are formulae which 
represent ordered pair relations in HP and can be shown to be strat­
ified in such a v/ay that one numeral can be attached to both x and 
x' and another to both y and y', then 
HP h Vu,V ( U %  ^ v4-> U  ^  /y'V ),
Theorem 10.4 shows that when considering sets being equipollent
in HP, it is only the vray in which the ordered pair relation can
be shown to be stratified ( \æ restrict our attention to stratified 
definitions from now on ) which is important. Hence the following 
definition of is independent of which we choose.
Definition 10.3 I f ( x , y , z )  represents an ordered pair relation
in HP and can be shovm to be stratified by attaching a numeral n
to X and a numeral m to y, and i = ra-n, then we write x^s^y for
x%;y/ y. Por definiteness, \ie could take z - ^x, [ . ^
i brackets
for ^  when i^^O, and , , ] , y y for Ÿ  ^hen i<0.
-i brackets
We can now reformulate the results which we quoted earlier as 
-n( ) and S<^,V. Another result of [54] shows that
-i( ) although, of course, V Our next theorem notes
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some properties of being i-equipollent (i.e. it is
obvious how these are generalisations of being 0-equipollent,
Definition 10.6 «  { y  j 3tG.x y= 4 . . . [tï . . .} 3 .
*1% bracket^
Theorem 10.7 The universal closures of the following statements
are provable in HP
(i) X ^ ^ x  ( i.e. X %:x ),
(ii) X % i y - > y
(iii) X %j^y^y
(iv) X.m
The proof of theorem 10.7 is straightforward. It might be 
interesting to investigate further properties of i-equipollence, 
but we shall next consider a method of extending HP.
It seems emminently reasonable to suggest that if u'^ ïi^ v^, for 
any integer i, then u and v are equipollent in an intuitive sense. 
Consequently, we let EHP be HP extended by adding a new symbol %  , 
together with the axiom
u 3c V for some integer i, u (^)
We shall not consider methods of formalising ('»^ ) in first order 
terms but will continue to treat it in an intuitive sense.
Theorem 10,7 then shows that %  has the properties
(i) x % x ,
(II) x % y - ^ y  Sx,
(III) xSy/^y Sz-^x«;z,
(Iv) x W ^ S x ,
so it seems that ^  is a more reasonable formulation of being 
equipollent than in HP as %  also posesses the intuitively true
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property (iv). To actually work in ENP we would probably have to 
add axioms asserting the existence of cardinals, as equivalence 
classes under %  , and other comprehension principles, but we shall 
leave these problems. We shall next consider the interpretations, 
when ^  is replaced by ^ , of two results which have been proved 
for NF.
In [491 it is shown that if IIP is consistent, then the 
axiom of counting is not provable in UP, This axiom is the intui­
tively true statement
Vn( Nn(n) *{m \ Un(m) ^  m4 n] <£ n  ),
T/here Un(n) is a formula saying ’ n is a natural number ' ( using 
for equipollence ). Hence, the axiom of counting says that if 
Nn(n), then for some t^n,
\^m I Nn(ra) ^  m< n} t. ( ^ ^ )
( To consider {if- if) in EUP we should really consider natural 
numbers as equivalence classes under ^ , rather than , but, for 
convenience, we continue to use Un defined using ^  .)
Intuitively, the reason why (+^^) is not derivable in UP is 
that the objects on the left and the right are of different 
" types ", although it is straightforward to show that the following 
version of ) is provable for some tgn,
•[ra \ Nn(m)^m<n} ^  1 t.
Thus in EUP we have \ m  |Un(m)^m<n] %  t, again suggesting that 
2? is a better notion of being equipollent than ^  .
Henson shov/ed in [23] that if Uc(x) is the cardinal of x,
then it is relatively consistent with UP that for finite sets x
we have Uc(6? (x))<Nc(x) or Uc(6^(x))> Nc(x). He also showed that 
we can have Uc(xCl> ) <  , =• or >  Uc(x). We have already noted
that the latter pathologies are eliminated in EUP as .
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In EUP X %  x^^^ÇiG^(x) so that G^(x) will probably be at least as 
big as X, but we do not seem to get an immediate answer to this 
problem.
There are a number of similar problems which could be invest­
igated in EUL'’ and one could also consider other properties which 
depend on ordered pairs. Por instance, in UP ordinals are equiv­
alence classes under similarity where this is defined using a 
0-bijection ( an obvious extension of our notation ), but it seems 
more natural to allow all i-bijections. To formulate such a theory 
in detail seems to require an inordinate amount of work. It would 
be nice to show that any such extension of EUP is inconsistent, 
but proofs using the idea of Cantor's theorem do not seem to yield 
such a result. The Burali-Porti paradox, perhaps ?
On the above basis we think it reasonable to claim that UP is 
not a nice set theory as various natural notions, such as equipollence, 
depend on the way in which ordered pairs are represented, Further, 
if the theory is extended to take care of tliese problems, then the 
resulting system would be extremely complicated and completely 
unusable,
10,4 Consistency of a fragment of UP
In [23] Ealperin showed that UP can be finitely axiomatised 
using extensionality and PI-P9, which are all instances of HP's 
comprehension axiom. By constructing a model in number theory in 
[C] , Benes showed that extensionality and P1-P8 are consistent. 
Starting from a Benes-1ike construction and iterating transfinitely 
we proved theorem 10.8. The proof which we now indicate starts 
from a model of W B  ( this is UP with extensionality replaced by 
3 z ^ x ^ V z  ( z 6 . x ^ z é y  ) - ^ x ~ y  ), wliich is proved consistent
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in [29] , as this is more straightforward. We only outline the 
proof as we will refer to this method again later. Modifications 
of it yield the relative consistency of other fragments of IIP, hut 
none of these methods seem to give a result for full HP.
Theorem 10.8 In ZP v/e can prove the consistency of the theory 
whose axioms are extensionality, P1-P5 and P7-P9.
fct oP
Proof ( Outline ) Let ^ 1 1 ^ , NPU in which 11^  is the^natural 
numbers. Me define a sequence of models ,E\^ for “X  6. hi.
E \ will always be AE^ and we define N \ by inductions
(i) Suppose that X  -f-1 and we are given . Put 
A y “ [t 1 f G U ^  and Vy,z t Vnê^ Ny ( nE^y<r>nE^z ) and
— [ m I for some t S A y  , m is the least member of t] ,
(ii) Por limit X  , put W a fi Nv .
We have ^  N j ^  ÎI, , , . , 3. and v/e next show that
is of cardinality to. Let k be the least natural number which 
represents an urelement in and then consider the sets
k, [k} , , , . , , ,  where V n  ( nE^-{kj<^ n ^ k  ) etc.
Each of these numbers can be ' replaced ’ only finitely many times 
in the production of the U» s and let x be that number which x 
’ ends up ’ as. Clearly, k, qkj , , . , , will all be different 
numbers so that 11^ »^^ is infinite.
As N-^ is always countable there must be some for which
Ny  N^-^, and let be the least such ordinal, Extensionality
clearly holds in ,E^^ and v/e indicate why PI holds in this
structure; the verifications of the other axioms are similar. PI is 
V^»v3yV/x ( x^ yt-^ -»x^ u^-nxe v ), and suppose that u,v£U/^. 
Then as (n^,E^'^ \= PI, there is a yc which satisfies PI there, 
y has the required property in . O
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10.5 Properties as properties
Sets can be considered as collections of objects which satisfy
a given property, or in other words, as the extensions of properties. 
This is the usual view from which people argue that the abstraction 
principle is intuitively plausible, but there seems to be no agree­
ment as to whether the variables are ranging over properties, objects, 
extensions over some collection, or anything else.
The property of " not satisfying itself " might show that
if properties are allowed to apply to properties, then we cannot 
expect them to be everyv/here defined: this is probably the motiva­
tion behind Kreisel's following remarks on properties in [34] •
" Por this notion, with y(Z x being interpreted as: the property 
y has the property x, 3 x V y  ( ytx<->P ) [[i.e, the abstraction
principle ] is indeed evident, provided that the most general kind 
of property is considered, including properties which are not 
everywhere defined, "
lie goes on to say that we cannot expect the usual logical laws 
to hold in such a system but we find it unlikely that the logical 
lav/s must be altered before v/e can talk about properties: v/e consider 
another way of approaching this problem below. ICreisel also suggests 
that no property can be defined for itself as argument whilst
consideration of the property of " being a property " suggests that
sometimes this might be quite harmless.
An earlier suggestion regarding an approach to properties 
( or concepts - we make no distinction between these notions ) 
was given by Godel in [19] , where he says
" It is not impossible that the idea of limited ranges of
significance could be carried out without the above restrictive
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principle [ referring to type theor;^ ''] . It might even turn out 
that it is possible to assume every concept to be significant 
everywhere except for certain " singular points " or " limiting
points ", so that the paradoxes would appear as something analogous
to dividing by zero. "
Me next outline a framework, based on the first order predicate 
calculus with identity, within which such ideas can be formalised. 
There are two predicates:
K(x,y) for " it is meaningful to ask if the property x has
the property y ", and
[* " the property x has the property y ", if h(x,y)
x h y  for si
[ no intended interpretation, if —iM(x,y),
If K is any -formula, then we define a translation giving 
a formula , as follows; every instance of V x  x'^y is replaced
by V x  ( h(x,y)~^x>ly ), of 3 x  xY^y by 3 %  ( M(x,y) ^ x)]^y ) etc., 
in such a way that xT^y only occurs when we have M(x,y). ( This
is an obvious generalisation of the translation described in section 
6,3, ) Then if K is an -formula, the abstraction principle takes 
the form
3y\/x ( Ti(x,y) -^( xY]^ y(-> ) ), (^)
Thus we have formalised a framework for talking about properties 
which are not meaningfully defined everywhere, without altering 
the underlying logic, Tlie paradoxes give us examples of properties 
for which '^M(x,y) holds and the main open problem is to say for 
which properties we have M(x,y). [27] shows that if we have
- 109 -
V x  M(x,y), then ( *^ ) is still inconsistent, and if v/e taJce 
M(x,y) as 3 z  x^^z, then turns into the class existence axiom
of NBG.
Question 10.9 Is there ariy natural way ( syntatic, or otherwise ) 
of saying when M(x,y) holds in the above system ?
During the above considerations the variables v/ere assumed to 
be ranging over properties. Given that a system of properties could
be produced, it is often suggested that extensional collections can
be obtained just by " taking the extensions of the properties ".
Two possible interpretations of this view are
(i) the extensions are taken over all possible objects, and
(ii) the extensions are talven over some given collection of
individuals,
and v/e suppose that x, y, , . . range over the resulting extensions. 
If (i) is assvimed and we suppose that the extensions are already 
objects, then it seems quite possible for two extensions to have 
the same extensions as members, but to differ over some property. 
Thus, such a system would only be extensional if there are urele- 
ments in the theory: this seems a little surprising. If (ii) is 
adopted, then it is not at all cleeir v/hat the membership relation 
is intended to mean and it certainly cannot be the original 
Consequently, we suggest that the notion of talcing the extensions 
of properties to get an extensional system is still in need of 
clarification.
10.6 Other views of properties
The approach to properties with which most people are familiar 
is that of Zermelo’s in ; which was refined in [4] and [21*] .
Basically, this view assumes the existence of a totality of all sets
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and works with it exactly as if it were a sebs we criticised this 
in chapter 9»
Zormelo's original motivation seems to be similar to Russell's 
notion of a propositional function and, although it is not complete­
ly clear, one v/ay of viewing this is as a variable ranging over the 
first order formulae of a given language ( cf, a weak second order 
logic ), However, during his later work ( see ) Zermelo
has extended his ideas to arbitary prepositional functions and it 
might be possible to malce some sense of this idea without using 
proper classes.
One method of extending ilBG is considered by Rowell in [50] , 
Here, properties are identified with their extensions on V and a 
different predicate is used for has the property ", This is 
sliown to lead to quite a strong theory with other interesting feat­
ures, but a point which does not seem to have been considered is 
\ihy two different properties should not have the same extension 
over V, Also, this approach does not allow quantifiers over proper­
ties to occur in the main comprehension axiom.
Another extension of Zermelo's approach is [5?] , where 
Reinliardt includes an axiom corresponding to Shoenfield's principle 
(see section 9.2). The intended semantics of this system has 
modal overtones and there are some similarities between the systems 
of [57] and p o ]  .
Despite our doubts about the ontological overtones of systems 
such as HDG; it is still possible to view these theories as ways 
of delimiting various levels in the cumulative hierarchy by means 
of their natural models. There seems to be an implicit belief 
that any reasonable set theory will have such a natural model, but 
next we attempt to give a counterexample to this. In chapter 7 ue 
suggested that the following is a reasonable axiom cf set theory
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(c) If X is a class of ordinals such that for some p» , X is a 
branch of E(^), then X is a set.
We suggest that NBG +(C) is a suitable theory as it clearly has no 
natural models ( i.e. models of the form t-l, ). The
consistency of i®Gi“(C) can bo proved in Ï.ÎX as follows. Let Jv 
be the least cardinal for which R V and then R5< ZF with the 
property that (C) is true for X being any subclass of RK . The 
usual relative consistency proof for M3G and ZF ( see [48] )
then gives a model ^R k U A , £ ^ of IIBGt'(C), for some AG R %  1 1.
Of course, iIBG t"(C) is not a reasonable set theory from our 
point of view because of the existence of proper classes, but it 
might be possible to include the essence of its axioms in a 
modified version of ZI' ( strong replacement is catered for in a 
mild second order logic so (C) is the only remaining problem ), 
Also, the fact that I.IK‘+“(C) is inconsistent can be taken as a 
condemnation of the naive approach to proper classes.
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Appendix
Some results on extended ordinal arithmetic
A.l Introduction
Extended ordinal arithmetic was introduced by Doner and Tarski 
( in [12] ) as a continuation of the recursive definition of
ordinal multiplication in terms of ordinal addition. The extended 
operations, Oy , are defined by
*^0% ^ & , when 0,
«COÿp = ^ U  ( (ocOyl% )& K ) ,  when Tf>0,
and it is straightforward to check that this is a natural general­
isation with 0, corresponding ( essentially ) to multiplication 
and 0^ to exponentiation. Theorem 5 of [l2] shows that 
OC 0^ (IT p ) ^   ^, but a few calculations show that the higher
operations increase much factor# Some basic properties of the 
extended ordinal operations, some identities and some results 
concerning main numbers ( i.e. those ordinals & such that for a 
given ^  p S also proved in [l2^ .
For convenience, we shall refer to [iz] as [D-Tj in this appendix* 
similarly, we refer to [63] and £64"] as £rR1] and ,
respectively.
Part of [pRl] gives necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the associativity and commutativity of 0^ when K  is a limit 
ordinal. The corresponding results for 0^ , Oj and 0^ are 
classical. In section 2 we prove analogous theorems for 0^ and 
indicate some other results. Section 5 gives some inequalities 
for the extended ordinal operations and we show how these prevent 
one from giving a straightforv/ard answer to one of the problems 
which was raised in [D-T] .
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It was suggested by J, Rubin ( in a letter ) that it should
be possible to extend some of the classical results about permuting
the elements of infinite sums to the extended operations and in 
section 5 ve indicate how some of these results can be directly 
transferred. Hovæver, it seems that many of the classical results 
for infinite sums are far from best possible and we improve one of 
them to a best possible result in section 4» Anderson has also 
taclcled some problems in this field (see [2]),
A.2 Some properties of 0 ^
Our first result gives necessary and sufficient conditions
for the associativity of ordinals with respect to O-j •
Theorem A.l (cc 0^ p )0^ iff one of the
following conditions holds
(1) any one of cC,^ , G is 0 or 1,
(2) 6 is an E -number and & ,
(3) s = (X> and ,
(4) 8~ 2, Of <to and p is any ordinal for which p »  lu ^  — p, p 
where p  s • • is the normal form of ^ ,
(5) G -2, and ^  is a limit ordinal, where the normal
form of p is as above and that of oC is O |4". . . , &
(6) ^^2, i ^  , oc>Loand«c is a successor ordinal,
(7) t€cü-3» |9 is an infinite successor ordinal such that (£ -l)\^,
where the normal form of p  is as above, and a proooss for 
obtaining a unique OC from f and S can be described,
(8) OC, p,£eu>-2 and + ocP'*.(£-l) «
Proof We omit the proof as the number of subcases which have to 
be considered would make it about ten pages longs the result does 
not seem to justify this. Q
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Cases (l) - (7) of theorem A.l give complete answers to the 
associativity of 0^ . Although it is easy to solve case (8) when 
one of the variables takes a small value, we have not found a 
general solution. From page 365 of [68] we see that the ordinals 
which are associative with respect to 0 ^  do not coincide with 
those which are associative with respect to 0^. Theorem A.4 shows 
that this situation is unlike that with respect to commutativity,
We cannot extend the methods used in proving theorem Al.l to 
higher ^  as we do not have a suitable representation of the first 
term of the normal form of Ûc 0^ ^  in terms of the normal forms of 
oc and p, but the the next theorem shows that a partial generalisation 
of theorem A.l gives a much nicer result.
Definition A.2 & is a main number of 0^  if for all oC , ^  < S
G . M(O^) is the collection of main numbers of 0^ •
Theorem A.3 If S is a limit ordinal and ^ )  2, then
(ocOjyp S — P 6 ) iff one of the following conditions
is satisfied
(1) OC or P is 0 or 1,
(2) ^<£eii(Ojy).
Proof Suppose that & is a limit ordinal and X ^  2, Then the 
theorem clearly holds if OC or ^  is 0 or 1, so tliat from now on 
suppose that Theorem 32 of Cd-TJ then shows that
(OCO^^ )0;^ y ^  G ) so we have
S iff (5 t-S
Now suppose that
A + S  (*)
If & then ^ Ç >  p <-j5 >  (Î tfi , so that ^ < g  .
Theorem 47 of shows that (2) will follow from G = &
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and we now prove this. Let + . . , he the normal form
of £ and then the normal form of ji+Q is to^ 'te^ v.^ for some 
e W-1. p  ^ G 80 that as the first term of
the normal form of is O o h ^  , (^) shows that G, ^  pi. £ ,
Hence “ 6 and ^  is an -number. Then, from (^), p 0%^ G ^ G  » 
as required.
If v/e have £ é M(O^), then £ ^ ^  ^ 0%^ £ "= G
so that (^) holds and the theorem is proved. ÇV
Theorem A.4 “X  0^ ^  iff OCO^ c: ^ 0^ OC
Proof Necessary and sufficient conditions for the commutativity 
of 0^ were given by Jacobsthal and his theorem is proved in [76] .
Our proof uses modifications of his method and we omit it because of
its length, ij
As in the case of associativity, the method of proof used in 
theorem A.4 does not extend to higher • Our next result shows 
that for certain the ordinals which are commutative with respect
to O y  are not commutative with respect to Og .
Theorem A. 5 If oC, j3 >  oc< p  , ' ^ ' ^ 2 and cc 0^ ^^ ^^  ^ ^
then cj^ O^ . ^  f - O^oC •
Proof Suppose that all the hypotheses of the theorem hold and that 
we also have «xO^ p - 0 - ^ c c  • Then oc is a limit ordinal and
p = , where t is an 8 -number greater than oC . Then, by
theorem 35 of [D-T]
OCO^g^.p (2.)^  ocOjy(cL. t.GC)= ocOa*(t.oc).
Then, using that theorem again, p
However, contradicting this. Cl
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Corollary A.6 If j O C , p are limit ordinals, ^  ^  2 and
ot ^ then P  <  oc'^ . ui.
Proof From the proof of the theorem
cCO^y+,P=oCOj«'(<x.^)4po^4(oC.^) and ^  OC ^ ^Oj^Cjg.oc)
SO that we get
P .CC 4%. 6 . (*c
Assuming that tlie normal forms of OC and P  are as usual, consider­
ing the normal forms of the sides of gives ^ , v ü C j ^  0C| +
Now let Oc ^ s . . . and p, - , .
Then otherwise + p, < p, , Hence
T  0 0 ^ '  y  +  6  w " ' ' - '  -  ( ' o o ' ^ O  4  û ' v .  "  ■ ^
|i = wP' t, t . . . 4 ^ UO 4 <X . 0» . Q
The following relation was defined and studied in [RRi] •
Definition A.7 oCL ^ ^  iff 3 G f 0 ( g 0 ^ c ^ - p ) .
L Y Î3 transitive for Y  = 0,1,2 or 3 and it is stated in [pRl] 
tîiat L/^  is not transitive. It is left as an open question in 
£eRi] as to whether or not D y  is transitive for limit y . Our 
next result gives necessary and sufficient condition for the 
transitivity of , when K  is a limit ordinal, so that from 
theorem 28 of [RHl] it then follows that L ^  is not, in general, 
transitive for limit 'if .
Theorem A.8 For limit Kj ^ £ andocL^G all hold
iff one of the following conditions is satisfied
(1) oc p and (\Ly £, ,
(2) A - S and D^ p ,
(3) oc = 1 < p and & ,
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(4) GC - 2, - 4, G 6 ( n  M(Ox ) ) and 4Ly£ .
Proof We omit the proof as it uses many of the results from .
The method is similar to, though more straightforward than, that 
used for theorem A.l, Q
A,3 Some inequalities
It is noted in [d-t] that no identities involving the 
operations Oq , . . • 0^ are Imown for the finite domain, except 
for those which are trivially implied by those which are already 
known for 0@ , . . , Oj . The straightforward method of proving 
such identities is to use induction together with an identity for 
cCQY ( G ). For ^  a  1,2 or 3 we have the following identities
^  0 I ( p ^ ) ~(ocO|^ )0o ( ocO $ )»
Ç, ) = (ocOi p )0, (ocOiJ, ),
« O j ( M c  î> ) = ( ^ ° }  )°î )•
This suggests that one might compare ocOjj (^O,, J, ) with 
(<X.O^  j3 )Oy_^ (<X.O G ) for i ^  but theorem A.9 shows that there 
are always strict inequalities betiveen these expressions in the 
finite domain for i^e-to-4* Thus a new method is required to 
answer Doner and Tarski's question affirmatively.
Theorem A.9 Suppose that oc, |3, G E w  -7 and -4.
Then, if Y  is even
0 y ( ^  Oo G ) )0^^, (ocO^ G ) •
Then, if is odd
(ocO^ ^  ) 0 ) T - i ( ^ 0 ^  g  ) > o c O ^ ( p O o  & ) > ( ^ O y g  ) O y . , ( o c O ,  G ) .
Proof Suppose that all the hypotheses of the theorem hold and 
that is even. Then put - max,( (1, £ ) and v/e get
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ocO^CPO^ & ('ï)+-6)
0^ *1^  )0y 2 by lemma 3l(i) of [D-T^
3  (oC 0^)] )Ojj-_ |(oCO^ 'r^  ) from the definition of 0^ 
>(oCO^p)0^.,(ocO^G ),
so that the first inequality of the theorem holds.
Next we prove that for ûl, p*, G e to-2, e <o -1 
oc0«-00^ É. )>(OCO^^ )Oy.,(ocO, G ), (:K)
and this implies one half of the second inequality. To prove (ijc) 
we firstly show that (oC (i )0^ £ > (^0© G ) holds for
the above range using induction on G  . Actually, we combine the 
induction and the basis steps by noticing that this is an equality 
when £ = 1.
(c3C0y ^ ) 0 ^ ( g 0 o t  G ) )Oy_%(ccOy p ) by assumption
>(cc0yO0o & ) )0y,jOC
= ^ ( pOo (GOo l) ), as required.
Now we prove ('^ using the same method.
G 0^ l ) ^ {  (ûCOÿ'p )0^.,(cxrO, G ) )0^ by assumption
>(ûcOy^ )0y_,( (ocO, G )0û oc) by above inequality 
=  (oc0% g )Oy-%(ocO % (G 0^ l) ), as required.
Finally we prove that for oc, pfix>-4, G,)?^to-2
G ^  (oco^g ), (X)jc)
and this implies the remaining half of the second inequality. The 
proof of ) is similar to that of ( ^ ) , using
(cxOjj^  ^  ) 0 ^ G  <Toe0^y( ^ 0 1G  ) as the first inequality. Q
A.4 The sums of permutations of a sequence of ordinals
If v/e are given an oc-sequence of ordinals and v/e permute the
members of that sequence to give a new oC-sequence, then the two
sequences often have different infinite sums. This is the reason
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for considering the problem of this section.
Definition A. 10 If a is an oC-sequence of ordinals, then S^(oC) 
is the number of different ordinals which can be obtained by 
permuting the members of a into an oC-sequence and taking the sum 
of that sequence.
One natural question is to find a best possible upper bound 
for S^(oc ) in terms of cC . This has not been fully ansv/ered in the 
literature, although the following results appear.
(i) (Erdos, [lÿ] ) If oC is finite, then
S (cc)4 max. (k.2*^ "’t l).S ,(bC-k) , and the proof shows that 
^ kCoC.cJ 8.
this result is best possible.
(ii) ( Sierpinski, [6?] ) S^(to)<io and S^(\ ) 4 ^  when \
is a countable ordinal. Clearly the first of these results is 
best possible and we shall show that the second one is also.
(iii) ( Ginsberg, [l8j ) If is a regular cardinal, then
-He-'.
Theorem A,11 improves on (iii) and completes the answer to 
the above question.
Tlieorem A. 11 Suppose that oc is an infinite ordinal. Then
(a) if or eç is weakly inaccessible, S^(OC) <[ , and
(b) otherwise, Sg^(^)4 oC •
Further, these results are the best that can be obtained indepen­
dently of a ,
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Proof Firstly, v/e shall show that and this clearly
follows from the following statement
If \  4  , then the number of different sums of \  -sequences of
ordinals, all of whose members are taken from a given set of ordinals 
of cardinality ^ , is 4  Kç. (l)
We prove (l) by induction o n C l e a r l y  its true for \  = 1. 
If its true for \  , then ^  aj — ^  a^  -t a. so that its also 
true for \ f l  as _
Now suppose that (l) holds for all and ^  is a limit
ordinal. Then a: — L) ( ^  b « ) and as there are at most Hr> 
different sums for pK'\ , the given sum must be the supremum of 
a subset of a set, B say, of ordinals,which has cardinality Mç, 
Either this subset has arbitarily large members in B or there is 
a least member of B which is not in it. Hence, the supremum of the 
subset is an initial segment of B ( under the natural ordering ) 
so that there are at most Mç different values for the \  sum. Thus
(l) is proved.
If a is an O f-sequence and S^(cc) — ^  , then for we
can obtain a P -sequence, b, with ^  x  by letting its first
SC terms be the same as a's and the remainder C*s. Let c be the 
(o^-l-l) sum . . .t . . . t-1, foroc<(x>^.
Then, by altering the last term, we get l) — , so that
l) 4  is the best possible inequality. Tlie prior 
observation then shows that S^(q c )^*=< is the best possible 
inequality vdien is not a cardinal,
The following example of Ginsberg's shows that we can have 
Sd( )t= : put d^~ for i <  u>^ and d^ = 1 for
i^cc^. Consequently, v/e can now restrict our attention to
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oC being a limit cardinal, 60i^  say, and we consider two cases.
Case 1 6 0 is singular.
We show that 3  a 8^( , This implies that all of (b)
holds. Let X  “ cf(6o^ ) and consider the sequence b ^  i.
i < w \
Clearly ^  i ^ and for any p<u>\ we show that there is a
permutation of b v/ith -sum ^ l), and the result will
then follow.
As W \ , for some \  and we can choose p  different
cofinal X  sequences, each of which has sum CjOiy, as follows.
Let f; S s b e  such that - U  f ( S ) >
f(£4rl)>f(G)4. ^ and all f(£ )>co^ . Then f(S ) f i, for i 4  p 
give the required sequences.
Now we form the required sum by letting the first ^ t e r r a s  
be the above cofinal sequences arranged one after another and then 
we " compress " the remaining elements of b, without altering 
their order, to take the remaining places. Clearly, the sum of 
this sequence is .( P f l ) .
Case 2 W \  is regular
Let a be an -sequence and v/e show that the number of different
sums which can be obtained by permuting the members of a
to another sequence and taking its sum is 4  This completes
the proof.
The method which we use for this case is an extension of that
of [67] and [is] . We can clearly suppose that infinitely many
of the members of a are non zero. Then, an element a^ is said to 
have the property P if
-£a.\ a.'^a^]. <1 then [isj shows that elements
J 3
of a have the property P.
Let V a. 3  k. 4- ojG and then for some & , %  a. :z f©i
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• Suppose that b is an consequence which is a permutation 
of a, and then as f® regular, there is some index, q say, such
that for q^ i ^  does not have the property P, We show that
Y L  \  (2)
By cardinality, there is some member of a, a^ say, such that
k 3' ^  and a^3> b^. We can then continue this argument, as in
[is] , to get "21 b. 4 .  If we suppose t hat^ b. =
then, by reversing the argument, we get , so that (2) holds.
Now we have shown that all sums take the form 21 b. 4- to^ 
for some q v. <-0^ , where all the terms with the property P occur 
before b^. Next we show that all terms which do not have the property
P may be replaced by 0 in the initial segment of b up to b^, without
altering the sum. We call the new terms bj^ . Suppose that this
works up to q and that bg does not have the property P, Then
b^ <  «-oG as there are arbitarily large terms 3  bp , so that
ba •+* 21 b. t toG s- 21 b. 4  , by the lemma of £67] • Thus
b ^  can be replaced by 0 without altering the sum. Hence all sums
are of the form 21 b . ' 4- , v/here the only non zero terms are
those having the property P. As there are less than 60^ such terms 
the result now follows from (l), [~V
A.5 Infinite extended ordinal operations
V7e define the infinite extended ordinal operations as a 
natural extension of infinite sums and products in definition 
A,12, Theorem A,13 shows that for limit , we can reduce many 
questions about S X ^  to questions about infinite sums, and 
corollary A,14 shows how theorem A.11 can be transferred to such 
operations.
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Definition A.12 =- 1 if ^ > 0  or 0 if X - 0.
3<o
Vdien 0, = (J ( ( a& )Os(aa ).
^ /i<ç 1<A J
Theorem A,13 If X is a limit ordinal, Ç3^2, ao 3^ 2 and all a^ 3  i»
then -n_K 0^(^(aj-|) ).
Proof We prove this result by transfini te induction on Ç  , and it 
clearly holds when Ç=:2, Suppose that it holds for all ,
and then
)0y a^ ) by definition
~  U  ( (a. Osj ^  (av -l) )0y a* ) by hypothesis
o<><4  ^ ®
=  U  ( a , 0 ^ ( ^  (a^ -1)0* (a. -l) ) )
X4p<e o<ç<p ^
by theorem 27 of [D-TJ
W  (®-o 0% 2 —  -i) ) by definition.
If ^ is a successor ordinal then this immediately gives the result. 
If A  is a limit ordinal then 22 a-v is also a limit ordinal and
Y<e ^
the result follows by theorem 15(iii) of [ D - T ^ • Q
Corollary A. 14 If Sy,^(oc) is the definition corresponding to
with replacing infinite sum and '2$ is a limit ordinal,
then theorem A.11 is also true when S ( ^  ) is replaced by S .a 6 J a
Proof Tliis follows from theorem A.11, the proof of theorem A.11 
and the theorem. Tlie only important point to note is that if b^ 
does not have the property P in Case 2, then we may replace it by 
2 rather than ly 0. D
It is possible to prove other theorems, like A,13, which 
enable us to transfer questions about infinite extended ordinal 
operations to those concerning infinite sums. Theorem A,15 is an 
example of such a result.
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Theorem A. 13 If ^  > 1  and (a y | i® a sequence of ordinals,
all of which are ^  ixP', then
( 2] S'V )•
Ç ' o<i<e -*
Proof Suppose that the hypothesis of the theorem holds and, 
initially, also suppose that all of the ay are lirait ordinals.
V7e prove the result in this case using transfinite induction as 
follows.
- V  ( %  ay ) )0^^ag ) by hypothesis
  LJ (s^ O ( XT )^ 0 A ) )
by theorem 32(i) of [D-T*]
U  (a^ ) ) by definition..
The initial result then follows as in the proof of theorem A.13,
Now drop the assumption that all of the a^ 's are limit 
ordinals. It is clear tliat we can define a sequence of ordinals, 
a^', with the property
W  4  ' -4 a-y ^  o>»(ai;*4 l) for i >  0, and a^ a a^.
Then, using the monoticity laws and the first result of this proof, 
we get
%  X ^ ( a / i r l )  ).
cK's<e
As all of the a^ are u)'\ we clearly have
^  2]^ to(a(,'t- l), so the inequalities give the result, Q
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